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“Growth that is inclusive, or growth that works 
for the poor, provides a stronger platform for 
future expansion and competitiveness.”
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i                                  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Slow economic growth has been a long-standing problem in the Philippines. During 1980-99, 
per capita growth of gross domestic product (GDP) averaged close to zero percent, far below the 
6.5 percent average per capita growth recorded for the East Asia and Pacific region as a whole. 
This lackluster performance largely explains why the rate of poverty reduction was so much slower 
in the Philippines than elsewhere in East Asia during those two decades. While many East Asian 
countries such as China, Thailand, and Vietnam cut their poverty rates in half over that period, 
poverty in the Philippines fell by less than half that amount.
2. Although economic growth picked up significantly in the past decade, its sustainability remains 
in question. After two decades of stagnation, the Philippine economy began to grow again by the 
mid-2000s, with per capita growth accelerating to an annual average rate of 3.5 percent during 2003-
06 and reaching a record high of 5.4 percent in 2007. Even before the global economic downturn 
of 2008 and 2009 set in, however, there were concerns that such growth would be difficult to 
sustain. These concerns revolved around the economy’s dependence on an exceptionally favorable 
external environment and the prevalence of various long-term growth constraints, particularly 
the lack of adequate infrastructure coupled with low overall investment levels, the persistence 
of high unemployment and emigration rates that reflected a lack of domestic opportunities, and 
governance weaknesses that undermined the investment climate. An inability to sustain the tax 
revenue effort and a high public debt ratio also contributed to investor uncertainty.
3. At the same time, the Philippines’ improved economic performance has not translated into 
greater progress in poverty reduction, indicating that growth has not been sufficiently inclusive. 
Despite the acceleration in economic growth after 2001, the share of the population living below 
the national poverty line did not decrease. Instead, official poverty estimates indicate that the 
overall incidence of poverty increased from 30.0 percent in 2003 to 32.9 percent in 2006.1 The 
poverty gap, which measures how far households lie below the poverty line, also increased 
from 2000 to 2006 as did poverty severity, which takes into account the poverty gap but places a 
higher weight on households that are further away from the poverty line. These observations are 
corroborated by perception surveys (Social Weather Station reports) which indicate that poverty 
and hunger have increased in recent years, as well as by the slow progress made toward some key 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets such as universal access to primary education and 
improved maternal and reproductive health. 
4. The lack of progress in poverty reduction is partly explained by the limited dynamism of the 
growth experienced in 2000-06, coupled with high degrees of income inequality. Although strong 
by Philippine historical standards, the resurgence in growth since 2000 has been modest by regional 
standards, so its impact would have been expected to be relatively modest. At the same time, 
1 Other poverty estimates based on different methods of calculation yield similar increases in poverty incidence over this period. 
For example, (income-based) World Bank calculations yield an increase from 31.1 percent to 32.9 percent over this period, while 
(consumption-based) calculations by Balisacan (2008) yield an increase from 26.0 percent to 28.1 percent. See also the papers 
presented at the National Conference on Imperatives for Poverty Reduction Amidst and Beyond the Global Economic Crisis, held in 
Manila on March 31, 2009.
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the Philippines has a very high level of income inequality. 
The World Bank’s Development Data Platform currently 
identifies the Philippines as having the most unequally 
distributed income (or consumption) among the East 
Asian middle-income countries, whether measured by 
the Gini coefficient or the relative shares earned by the 
richest and lowest quintiles of the population. The high 
degree of income inequality has the effect of rendering 
poverty less responsive to increases in economic growth, 
thus slowing down the poverty reduction process. 
5. Non-income indicators also reveal a high level of 
inequality in the Philippines. Large inequalities in health 
and education outcomes and in access to services persist 
across regions and income groups. In health, for example, 
one child in a thousand died between ages 1-5 among the 
wealthiest quintile of the population, compared to 25 per 
thousand in the poorest quintile and 33 per thousand in 
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). 
Similar disparities can be seen in education, with 82.9 
percent of children 16 years or younger in the poorest 
quintile being in school compared to 98.0 in the richest 
quintile. In the ARMM, only 78 percent of children 16 
years or younger attended school, compared to the 
national average of 90.2 percent and the National Capital 
Region (NCR) average of 94.3 percent. These discrepancies 
indicate a highly unequal distribution of human capital 
that becomes reflected in unequal earnings.
6. The failure of poverty to decline in 2000-06 is also 
linked to a worsening distribution of income. Although 
the economic growth experienced in the Philippines during 
2000-06 may have been overestimated due to various 
statistical limitations associated with data collection and 
compilations of the National Accounts, the corroborating 
evidence indicates that, on balance, aggregate economic 
growth was positive. At the same time, various indicators 
show that poverty did not decline. This implies that the 
modest growth that did take place during 2000-06 must 
have resulted in a deteriorating distribution of income, 
meaning that the benefits of growth have not been shared 
with the poor. 
7. Several factors have contributed to the apparent 
deterioration in the distribution of income and 
consumption. These factors include:
• An unequal sectoral distribution of growth. The main 
problem from a poverty reduction perspective has been 
that the sector that employs the bulk of low-skilled 
workers (agriculture) has been growing very slowly, 
while the sectors that have been contributing most 
to the acceleration of GDP growth after 2000 (mainly 
manufacturing) have been very capital-intensive and 
have not generated many new jobs. Furthermore, the 
employment generated in the manufacturing and 
services sectors has mainly benefited the more skilled 
workers, who tend not to be poor.
• An unequal pattern of regional development.  Income 
and poverty levels differ significantly across regions. The 
NCR, which accounts for only 13 percent of the entire 
population, is the richest region in the Philippines, with 
a per capita GDP (in constant 1985 Pesos) of P37,855 
in 2006.2 At the other extreme is the ARMM, with an 
average per capita GDP of P3,486. Notably, the regions 
with the lowest poverty incidence have higher degrees 
of economic activity. The NCR contributed 37.2 percent 
of national GDP in 2006 and had the lowest regional 
poverty headcount rate at 10.4 percent. 
• Intense demographic pressures due to rapid population 
growth. Despite a modest decline in fertility rates over 
the last few decades, the country’s population growth 
rate remains among the highest in the region. The 
continuous increase in the working-age population 
is putting tremendous pressure on the labor market, 
straining the economy’s capacity to maintain full 
employment and generate adequate real wage growth. 
Between 2001 and 2007, employment grew by 13 
percent, while the working-age population grew by 17.6 
percent. Meanwhile, the average real wage declined by 
5 percent between 2003 and 2006. 
• Declines in the relative price of labor provided by the poor. 
A growth pattern that is biased toward sectors that are 
most intensive in the use of unskilled labor would put 
upward pressure on the unskilled wage economy-wide, 
thus raising the incomes of the poor. However, as noted 
above, the recent pattern of growth in the Philippines has 
been biased against the unskilled labor-intensive sectors. 
• An unequal distribution of human capital and access 
to social services as well as in some cases, a decline of 
public spending on social services that mainly benefit 
2 NCR is also the most densely populated, with 16,100 persons per km2, 
compared to a national average of 226.
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the poor. Although the Philippines has made progress 
in building human capital through health and education 
and providing adequate social protection, major 
challenges remain in ensuring equity and access to 
quality basic services across the country. 
8. Although the economic downturn in 2008-09 has 
refocused attention on the need to restore growth and 
economic recovery, it does not diminish the importance 
of ensuring that growth is more inclusive. Clearly, more 
remains to be done to boost aggregate economic growth. 
However, a greater focus on distribution is also warranted 
given the limited poverty-reducing impact of the growth 
achieved in recent years, which suggests that more growth 
along the same lines as before will not be enough to yield 
the desired poverty reduction outcome. Broad-based 
participation in the growth process remains critically 
important to ensure that the benefits of growth are 
shared by the poor and most vulnerable. It also provides a 
stronger platform for future growth and competitiveness. 
For the Philippines to sustain development and reduce 
poverty going forward, it must therefore look beyond 
simple growth toward achieving more inclusive growth. 
9. To reduce poverty and build a broader base for 
future economic prosperity, a two-pronged strategic 
approach to fostering more inclusive growth is needed. 
Achieving such growth will not be easy while the global 
economic slowdown persists. Moreover, the post-crisis 
external environment is likely to be less favorable than 
before, which threatens to leave the Philippine economy 
on a lower growth plateau in the absence of reforms. This 
adds further urgency to the removal of growth constraints 
that already existed before the crisis.
10. The first prong of this strategic approach is to take 
actions that enhance income-earning opportunities, 
particularly for the poor.   Improving income opportunities 
for the poor requires both removing constraints to growth 
and productivity in labor-intensive sectors where the 
poor are concentrated as well as removing constraints to 
employment generation in well-performing sectors of the 
economy. At the same time, it is critical to foster greater 
labor mobility to facilitate the movement of workers to 
better employment opportunities. A first step would 
be to promote overall growth by addressing the main 
constraints of (i) a vulnerable fiscal situation; (ii) inadequate 
infrastructure, particularly in transport and electricity; and 
(iii) a weak investment climate due largely to governance 
concerns. In terms of sectoral emphasis, the agriculture 
sector, where most of the poor are currently engaged, 
requires special attention. The manufacturing and higher-
productivity services sectors are also important since they 
offer the most promise in terms of future income-earning 
opportunities. With regard to eliminating barriers to factor 
mobility, the labor market deserves special attention, both 
because labor is the poor’s main asset and because the 
Philippines’ labor market legislation appears to be among 
the most rigid in the region.
11.  The key to generating better income-earning 
opportunities is the integration of lagging regions 
and sectors of the economy with the leading ones. 
The 2009 World Development Report (WDR) argued 
that spatial disparities in income and production are 
inevitable, as they are driven by economies of scale and 
agglomeration effects, and that government efforts to 
spread out economic activity equally across the board 
have generally proven to be futile. The same can be 
said about government efforts to “pick winners” among 
different economic sectors. As noted above, the poor in 
the Philippines mostly reside in rural areas and work in 
agriculture, which has been stagnant for years. Rather 
than targeting productive investments directly to rural 
areas and the agricultural sector, the 2009 WDR argues 
in favor of hitching this lagging, rural-based sector to the 
more dynamic urban-based manufacturing and services 
sectors through the application of ‘spatially blind’ policies. 
Such policies primarily involve the elimination of market 
distortions that inhibit sector development and interfere 
with the functioning of markets, coupled with investments 
in spatially connective infrastructure and human capital 
and the maintenance of sound macroeconomic policies. 
12. The second prong of the strategic approach is to ensure 
that poor households can participate in markets and 
benefit from growth by enhancing their human capital. 
Given the implications for growth, employment, health, 
and other areas, reducing fertility rates will be critical to 
poverty reduction. Greater efforts are also needed to 
improve access to education, health, and social protection 
services, particularly among the poorest populations 
and in the poorest regions. Public spending in health, 
education, and social protection for the poor also needs to 
be improved. In general, spending levels in these sectors 
suffered from the fiscal crisis in the past decade, and the 
levels of spending are still much lower than in comparable 
countries. Furthermore, spending in these sectors has 
also not been adequately targeted to the poor. Other 
systemic problems in public spending, such as poor budget 
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execution, result in even best-laid plans not being achieved. 
Judiciously increasing spending in these sectors, better 
targeting the programs that would benefit the poor, and 
improving expenditure management will be important for 
allowing the poor to benefit from growth and to participate 
in it in the future. In addition, improving accountability in 
service delivery will help make services more responsive to 
the actual needs and demands of poor clients. 
Summary of Recommendations
A. Enhancing Income Opportunities
13. Because more dynamic growth is essential for poverty 
reduction, the main constraints on growth identified in 
previous diagnostic studies for the Philippines need to 
be eliminated, which requires:
•  Strengthening the government’s revenue collection efforts, 
both on the tax policy side and on the tax administration 
side. A possible target would be to reestablish the tax 
ratio prevailing before the East Asian financial crisis – 17 
percent of GDP – over a period of 5 years.
•  Raising the public infrastructure investment effort. 
  A possible target would be to double the GDP-share 
of public investment over a period of 5 years.  At the 
same time, it would be advisable to set up a high-level 
commission to review the effectiveness of existing public-
private partnership arrangements and consider ways of 
strengthening them.
• Strengthening public expenditure and financial 
management systems, both at the national and sub-
national levels, with the aim of developing a well-
planned public investment pipeline that complements 
private sector activities along lines of revealed 
comparative advantage and of improving budget 
execution performance. 
• Improving the transparency of the public sector budget 
and in public financial management, to improve 
governance and the public’s perceptions of governance. 
This includes reducing the scope for discretionary public 
sector management, both in terms of budget spending 
and civil service appointments.
• Improving the investment climate by reducing the 
‘behind the border constraints’ that inhibit business 
development, especially in manufacturing.
14. Improved productivity is critical for agricultural 
growth, which can still make a significant contribution 
to poverty reduction in the Philippines. The agriculture 
sector’s contribution to poverty reduction has been much 
weaker in the Philippines than elsewhere in East Asia. 
The poor performance of agriculture primarily reflects 
the closing of the “land frontier” and low total factor 
productivity growth. Key factors contributing to low 
productivity growth are the (i) agrarian reform policies 
that interfere with the functioning of land markets, 
aggravate the problem of declining farm size, and render 
access to land more difficult for small-scale farmers; (ii) 
high tariff and non-tariff barriers in agriculture, in part 
linked to policies seeking to achieve self-sufficiency in 
basic food commodities, which have stifled competition; 
and (iii) inadequate public investment in the sector. 
These findings point toward the need to review the 
existing policy framework in agriculture, with particular 
attention to the strategy to achieve self-sufficiency in the 
production of rice and other basic commodities. In this 
context, policymakers may consider:
• Reducing the high tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade 
in agricultural commodities.
• Setting up a commission to review the current land 
reform policy with a view to improving the functioning 
of land markets.
• Reviewing the need for public infrastructure investments 
benefiting agriculture, but on a very selective basis in 
areas with revealed growth potential.
15. The non-farm sector has become an important 
steppingstone out of poverty for rural households and 
will continue to grow in importance. Even with the 
preceding reforms, agriculture will not become the main 
pathway out of poverty in the Philippines. Studies show 
that, increasingly, the main escape from poverty has been 
through the secondary and tertiary sectors. Agriculture 
can still play an important role in remote rural areas with 
high geo-physical endowments that give agricultural 
production a natural advantage. Nevertheless, public 
investment policy should seek to remain spatially and 
sectorally blind so as not to bias the development of farm 
versus non-farm economic activities. 
16. The contribution of manufacturing to growth and 
employment could be strengthened by measures to 
improve sector performance. In manufacturing, three 
sets of factors have impeded a more dynamic growth 
performance and limited its employment generating 
impact: (i) lack of competition, (ii) shortcomings in the 
investment climate, and (iii) factor market distortions 
that tend to promote more capital-intensive production 
techniques, resulting in limited labor absorption. To 
remove these barriers, policymakers may consider:
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of an anti-monopoly authority.
• Setting up a working group to review potential 
bottlenecks in the financial system that inhibit access to 
financing by small and medium-sized enterprises.
• Addressing the most important shortcomings in the 
investment climate, which have been identified as (i) the 
low quality of governance, particularly the prevalence of 
corruption, and (ii) the low quality of public infrastructure, 
especially in regard to the power sector.  
• Creating a high-level commission to review the country’s 
labor market regulations and institutions with the aim 
of enhancing job creation.
17. Beyond creating opportunities, policies must enable 
workers to move to those opportunities and allow the 
labor market to function efficiently. The mobility of 
labor in the Philippines may be hindered by labor market 
legislation that was designed to protect labor but that 
ends up interfering with the labor market clearing process 
and artificially raises the cost of labor. To facilitate greater 
labor mobility, it is necessary to review the existing 
labor market legislation and institutions—especially 
those associated with minimum wages and limitations 
on temporary contractual arrangements—while at the 
same time considering the introduction of alternative 
mechanisms of social protection that generate fewer 
distortions into the labor market. The recent debate in 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries on the so-called flexicurity model 
provides useful insights for potential new approaches 
to tackle the problems of the Filipino labor market. The 
international evidence suggests that efficiency gains 
might be achieved by strengthening social protection—i.e. 
unemployment insurance, wage subsidies, safety nets—in 
a way that is inclusive and mobility-friendly. 
B. Assisting Households to Participate 
     in Markets
18. Improving health service delivery is critical to poverty 
reduction. Evidence from the Philippines and elsewhere 
shows how critical good health is to poverty reduction. 
For example, decreasing fertility can reduce demographic 
pressures and contribute to improved growth in per 
capita incomes, while better nutrition improves cognitive 
function and productivity and reduces loss of income from 
morbidity and mortality. In the Philippines, key sector 
concerns from a poverty perspective are the country’s 
high fertility rates, highly disparate distribution of health 
indicators across regions and income groups, and uneven 
progress toward attaining the MDGs. The major sector 
limitations contributing to these outcomes are (i) uneven 
access to health services across socio-economic and 
geographic locations; (ii) low and declining levels of health 
spending, particularly at the local levels, which results in 
high out-of-pocket expenditures for the poor; and (iii) lack 
of accountability by the service providers.
19. Given the implications for inclusive growth and 
health outcomes for the poor, one priority area is to 
strengthen family planning. Population growth has 
major implications not only for health but also for future 
public expenditure requirements, employment, human 
capital investment, and environmental management. 
However, use of family planning has stagnated in the past 
decade, with persistent unmet needs for family planning 
and inadequate access to family planning services for 
poor women. In 2003, only 24 percent of women in the 
poorest quintile were using family planning, compared to 
58 percent in Vietnam and 49 percent in Indonesia. Over 
half of pregnancies in the Philippines are unintended. 
While poorer women typically want more children than 
wealthier women, women in the poorest 40 percent of 
the population have between 1.5-2.1 more children than 
they desire (Guttmacher Institute, 2009). Social marketing 
could help encourage better family planning practices 
among the middle and upper classes, while the poor will 
require enhanced public service provision. 
20. To address the wide disparities in access to health 
services among the rich and poor and among different 
regions, increased public spending for properly targeted 
interventions is needed.  Such measures could include:
• Increasing public spending targeted to greater vaccination 
coverage, improving access to health professionals and 
facilities for deliveries, raising the nutritional status of 
children, and improving water supply and sanitation in 
marginal areas. 
• Providing more funding and appropriate incentives to 
local governments to increase expenditures on health 
and to upgrade the quality of, and access to, essential 
maternal and child health services. 
• Expanding coverage of the National Health Insurance 
Program (NHIP) by reviewing the voluntary component, 
expanding government-subsidized enrollment of the 
poor, and improving the benefit package—in particular, 
through revising the current inpatient benefit and 
provider payment schemes, and by introducing primary 
care and outpatient drug benefits. 
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21. Efforts are also needed to ensure better quality 
service provision in health, such as:
• Improving accountability in the health system by 
introducing performance benchmarks, holding hospital 
management accountable through explicit contracts, 
and scaling up performance-based financing. 
• Increasing access to essential drugs and quality 
medicines by strengthening regulation, increasing 
procurement transparency, expanding government 
subsidies, and promoting further competition. 
• Enhancing the overall stewardship of the health sector 
by improving monitoring and evaluation of the sector and 
the regulation of the private health care sector. 
22. Improving education and skills is also critical for 
enabling households to take full advantage of the 
income-earning opportunities available to them. 
Education clearly plays a key role in assisting households 
to participate in markets. In the Philippines, daily wages 
increase monotonically with education level, with 
university graduates earning P354 a day, while workers 
with no elementary education earn only P106 a day.3 
Although significant progress has been made in the 
education sector, some remaining concerns from a 
poverty perspective are the very disparate distribution 
of education attainment indicators across income groups 
with very high dropout rates among the poor, decelerating 
college enrollment rates, and increasing skill gaps in the 
manufacturing and services sectors. Key sector limitations 
contributing to these outcomes are (i) uneven access to 
education across regions due in part to an equally uneven 
distribution of public spending on education, (ii) declining 
public spending on education from an already very low 
overall level, (iii) inefficient sector resource management, 
and (iv) lack of accountability in the provision of services. 
23. To help increase educational enrolments and reduce 
inequalities, it is necessary to expand demand-side 
interventions and scholarship programs, particularly 
among the poor. Conditional cash transfer programs, which 
provide transfers to families who fulfill certain criteria 
such as school enrollment for children, can be an effective 
demand-side intervention for the poor. Effective scholarship 
programs and student loan programs should also be 
expanded for the poorest income quintile to help reduce 
the financial burden of schooling for poor households.
3 See World Bank (2009c).
24. Efforts are also needed to enable the provision 
of quality education services around the country, 
including:
• Raising the level and efficiency of education expenditures. 
Greater real per capita spending in basic education is 
crucial.
• Using the limited public funding for tertiary education 
more strategically. 
• Ensuring that adequate resources reach schools in a 
timely manner, applying an equity- and poverty-based 
formula for allocating school maintenance and other 
operating expenses.
• Expanding the involvement of local communities and the 
private sector. Where available, private sector capacity 
should also be utilized in cases where it has been shown 
to be more effective, but under an improved quality 
assurance framework.
25. To help address the problem of skills gaps, which is 
critical to future economic growth, higher education and 
TVET need to be more responsive to the needs of the 
labor market. This requires:
• Improving the quantity and quality of information on 
the labor market, with better and more complete firm 
and labor force surveys. 
• Strengthening the linkages between post-secondary 
and tertiary education and industries through greater 
collaboration in curriculum design, training, and 
research and development to make education more 
responsive to the demands of employers.
• Articulating better the skills supply system through 
strengthened skills certification and a better education 
and training quality assurance and accreditation system.
26. Strengthening social protection is another key 
component of assisting households to participate 
in markets. Having adequate protection from shocks 
helps minimize disruptions to income as well as prevent 
adverse coping behaviors—including reduced spending 
on education and health—which can lead to greater 
destitution in the long run. Therefore, providing adequate 
social protection is crucial for making growth more inclusive. 
In general, however, social protection programs in the 
Philippines have been ineffective in preventing poverty 
increases during recessions or calamities. This is primarily 
due to inadequate targeting and a lack of accountability 
in the provision of social protection services. As a result, 
households often are forced to resort to self-defeating 
coping mechanisms, while legislators pass employment 
protection legislation that ends up hurting the poor.
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27. A number of measures will be essential to making 
the system of social protection more effective, such as:
• Better targeting to reduce the amount of program 
leakage and ensure that social protection programs 
benefit the poor and vulnerable. The Proxy Means 
Test (PMT) methodology is one of the most advanced 
targeting systems for this purpose. Other targeting 
methods include simpler categorical targeting (e.g., 
elderly, disabled), geographical targeting (universal 
coverage in areas with high poverty incidence), and 
self-targeting, where limited assistance is offered to 
everybody but at some costs to households, such that 
only the neediest would participate.
• Improving policy coordination in social protection 
policy. Building on previous advances, the next step 
is for the implementing agencies of social protection 
programs, such as the Department of Education 
(DepEd), Department of Health (DOH), and Department 
of Labor and Employment (DOLE), to take greater 
ownership in the results of the National Social Welfare 
Program assessment, which are likely to involve budget 
reallocations within departments or across agencies. 
• Developing the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program 
(4Ps) to serve as the backbone of a modern and more 
consolidated social protection system for the Philippines. 
The 4Ps is a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program 
providing health and education grants to qualified 
households on the condition that the children be sent 
to schools and health centers for regular check-ups and 
vaccinations. It uses a PMT targeting mechanism based 
on best practice examples from other countries, and it 
appears to have performed well in the 4Ps pilot areas.
• Enhancing the capacity of government agencies 
involved in social protection to help ensure successful 
implementation. The 4Ps, in particular, requires 
significant administrative capacity in the Department of 
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). To roll out the 
program successfully, extensive training will be needed 
on all the operational steps of the program for staff at 
the central and local levels. 
C. Cross-Cutting Issues
28. To support the higher level of spending needed to 
implement the measures described above, tax revenue 
collection must be improved. The preceding discussion 
noted that the delivery of social services was seriously 
underfunded and recommended significant increases 
in public spending on education and health. A similar 
funding gap was noted earlier in public infrastructure 
spending, also warranting higher public spending. Raising 
public spending in the amount needed to address the 
problems noted in each of these areas will run into fiscal 
constraints, however, unless the government is capable 
of reversing the ongoing decline in tax revenues. A key 
priority, therefore, is to introduce a new round of tax 
reforms and strengthen tax administration in order to 
provide a sustainable basis for expanding public spending 
in priority areas.
29. As a basis for formulating appropriate policies to foster 
more inclusive growth, the nation’s statistical systems 
need to be strengthened. Both the National Accounts 
(NA) and the Family Income and Expenditure Surveys 
(FIES) exhibit problems that make it difficult to track the 
evolution of poverty. Some of these problems are not 
unique to the Philippines and result from measurement 
conventions in the compilation of national accounts. 
However, there also appear to be serious shortcomings 
in the quality of the data collected in the Philippines. 
Several programs, in part supported by the World Bank, 
are underway to analyze these shortcomings and begin to 
address them. These programs need to be implemented 
expeditiously. Economic and social problems are difficult 
to tackle when they cannot be adequately measured.
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“A key strategic component for fostering 
inclusive growth is the improvement of income 
opportunities, particularly for the poor.” 
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1                INTRODUCTION
1. Slow economic growth has been a long-standing problem in the Philippines. During 1980-99, 
per capita growth of GDP averaged close to zero percent, far below the 6.5 percent average per 
capita growth recorded for the East Asia and Pacific region as a whole. This lackluster performance 
largely explains why the rate of poverty reduction was so much slower in the Philippines than 
elsewhere in East Asia during that period. While many East Asian countries such as China, Thailand, 
and Vietnam succeeded in cutting their poverty rates in half over this period, poverty in the 
Philippines fell by less than half that amount.
2. Although economic growth picked up significantly since the East Asian financial crisis in the 
late 1990s, its sustainability remains in question. After two decades of stagnation, the Philippine 
economy began to grow again by the mid-2000s, with per capita growth accelerating to an annual 
average rate of 3.5 percent during 2003-06 and reaching a record high of 5.4 percent in 2007. Though 
still modest by East Asian standards, this resurgence of growth represented a major improvement 
by historical standards. The Philippines had not seen such levels of growth since the 1970s. Even 
before the global economic downturn of 2008 and 2009 set in, however, there were concerns 
that such growth would be difficult to sustain. These concerns revolved around the economy’s 
dependence on an exceptionally favorable external environment which was fueling economic 
booms worldwide and the prevalence of various long-term growth constraints, particularly the 
lack of adequate infrastructure coupled with low overall investment levels, the persistence of 
high unemployment and emigration rates that reflected a lack of domestic opportunities, and 
governance weaknesses that undermined the investment climate. An inability to sustain the tax 
revenue effort and a high public debt ratio, despite the fiscal reforms introduced in the first half of 
this decade, also contributed to investor uncertainty.
3. Equally worrisome is that the Philippines’ improved economic performance did not translate 
into greater progress in poverty reduction. Given the acceleration in economic growth after 2001, 
a surprising development is that the share of the population living below the national poverty line 
did not decrease. Rather, the overall incidence of poverty increased from 30.0 percent in 2003 to 
32.9 percent in 2006, according to the official poverty estimates.4 The poverty level is now back 
to where it was at the end of the 1990s. This observation is corroborated by perception surveys 
(Social Weather Station reports) which indicate that poverty and hunger have increased in recent 
years, as well as by the slow progress made toward achieving some key MDG targets such as 
universal access to primary education and improved maternal and reproductive health. So, even 
if the resurgence of growth observed in the mid-2000s had been sustained, it would have offered 
little hope for rapid poverty reduction.  
4 Other poverty estimates based on different methods of calculation also yield similar increases in poverty incidence over this period. 
For example, (income-based) World Bank calculations yield an increase from 31.1 percent to 32.9 percent over this period (see Table 
1), while (consumption-based) calculations by Balisacan (2008) yield an increase from 26.0 percent to 28.1percent. See also the 
papers presented at the National Conference on Imperatives for Poverty Reduction Amidst and Beyond the Global Economic Crisis, 
held in Manila on March 31, 2009.
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4. The lack of progress in reducing poverty despite 
accelerating economic growth indicates that growth has 
not been sufficiently inclusive. The apparent combination 
of economic expansion and rising poverty flies in the 
face of the strong empirical regularity that has been 
observed worldwide between falling poverty and positive 
economic growth. A number of factors have weakened 
the link between poverty reduction and growth in the 
Philippines. One is that the resurgence in growth was 
rather limited in magnitude; though strong by Philippine 
historical standards, it remained weak by regional 
standards. Another factor is the degree of inequality in 
the Philippines, which is high by regional standards and 
has the effect of rendering poverty less responsive to 
increases in economic growth rates. Finally, the modest 
growth that has taken place in the Philippines since 
the late 1990s appears to have been accompanied by a 
worsening distribution of income. Factors contributing to 
that bias are the unbalanced sectoral and regional patterns 
of growth as well as the unequal distribution of human 
capital, which reduces the capacity to take advantage of 
growth opportunities.
5. This Report seeks to deepen the understanding of the 
factors impeding broad-based growth in the Philippines 
and to lay out options for addressing them. While the 
last two Development Policy Reports prepared by the 
World Bank5 have focused on bringing about sustained 
aggregate economic growth, this report focuses more on 
distributional considerations. More remains to be done 
to boost aggregate economic growth, so the findings and 
recommendations of the earlier reports remain valid. A 
greater focus on distribution is warranted, however, in 
view of the limited poverty-reducing impact of the growth 
achieved in recent years, which suggests that more 
growth along the same lines as before will not be enough 
to yield the desired poverty reduction outcome. Instead, 
a different, more inclusive type of growth is needed.    
6. The economic downturn in 2008-09 has refocused 
attention on the need to restore growth and economic 
recovery, but it does not diminish the importance of 
ensuring that growth is more inclusive. On the contrary, 
broad-based participation in the growth process remains 
critically important to ensure that the benefits of growth 
5 Further technical detail on each topic discussed here is provided in the 
Background Papers and Annexes that are collected in a separate volume 
which accompanies the Main Report and is available upon request.
are shared by the poor and most vulnerable. It also provides 
a stronger platform for future growth and competitiveness. 
For the Philippines to sustain development and reduce 
poverty going forward, it must therefore look beyond 
simple growth toward achieving more inclusive growth. 
7. A key strategic component for fostering inclusive 
growth is the improvement of income opportunities, 
particularly for the poor. Improving income opportunities 
for the poor requires both removing constraints to growth 
and productivity in labor-intensive sectors where the 
poor are concentrated as well as removing constraints to 
employment generation in well-performing sectors of the 
economy. At the same time, it is critical to foster greater 
labor mobility to facilitate the movement of workers to 
better employment opportunities. 
8. Another critical strategic component is to ensure that 
the poor can take full advantage of improved income 
opportunities by assisting their market participation. In 
particular, stronger efforts are needed to build human 
capital through improved health and education service 
delivery, so workers can seize the improved opportunities 
available to them. Having a healthy and well-educated 
workforce will, in turn, contribute to poverty reduction 
and help spur economic growth. Given the large share of 
the population that is vulnerable to falling into poverty, 
greater attention to social protection is also needed. This 
helps to protect workers and households against shocks 
and from resorting to coping mechanisms with pernicious 
long-term consequences, thereby enabling them to 
engage more fully in productive activities. 
9. Organization of the Report. The Main Report is 
organized into three parts:6 Part I provides the overall 
context by describing the level and evolution of poverty 
and inequality in the Philippines and by analyzing the 
factors that could be weakening the link between 
economic growth and poverty reduction. It also provides 
a brief profile of the poor. Part II addresses the first 
strategic component for fostering inclusive growth, which 
refers to the enhancement of income opportunities and 
ensuring greater labor mobility for the poor. It begins by 
reviewing recent economic developments, with particular 
attention to employment generation, and evaluates the 
6 Further technical detail on each topic discussed here is provided in the 
Background Papers and Annexes that are collected in a separate volume 
which accompanies the Main Report and is available upon request.
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potential of key economic sectors to generate growth 
and productive employment. Part II then turns to the 
related challenge of ensuring labor mobility, identifying 
signs of labor market segmentation and factors that may 
be responsible for labor market rigidities which inhibit the 
fluid movement of workers toward the most productive 
activities. Part III discusses the other main component of 
fostering inclusive growth, which is to ensure that workers 
and households are well-equipped to take advantage of 
productive employment opportunities. It reviews the 
current state of health, education, and social protection in 
the Philippines and proposes measures for strengthening 
social service delivery.
Part 1   
“The absence of more dynamic economic growth, 
coupled with high degrees of income inequality, 
partly explains why poverty failed to decline 
since 2000.”
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5                         Understanding Poverty 
Part 1     and Inequality
A. Recent Trends in Poverty and Income Distribution
1. The Philippines made progress in the fight against poverty during the 1980s and 1990s, but at 
a relatively slow pace.  Using the US$1.25-a-day income threshold measure of poverty, it succeeded 
in reducing poverty from around 30 percent in the early 1980s to just over 22 percent at the end of 
the 1990s. Though significant, the decline of poverty in the Philippines over this period was quite 
weak compared to other countries in the region (Figure 1). As a result, the poverty rate for the East 
Asia and Pacific region as a whole is now below the Philippine rate, even though it was nearly twice 
as high just two decades ago. This notable difference in the pace of poverty reduction was mainly 
due to an equally notable difference in the pace of per capita economic growth, which averaged 0.1 
percent in the Philippines over this period, compared to 6.5 percent in the rest of the region.7
2. Progress in poverty reduction was interrupted by the East Asia financial crisis in 1997-98. 
Although the Philippine economy recovered after the crisis, with GDP growth reaching a high of 7.1 
percent in 2007, its poverty indicators remained unchanged or worsened. The poverty headcount 
ratio, or proportion of the population with incomes below the national poverty line, remained 
about the same between 2000 and 2003, and then increased between 2003 and 2006 (Table 1). 
The increase in poverty over this period has been confirmed by different sources using different 
7 Also, the Philippines started out with lower poverty levels in the early 1980s and, thus, had already reaped the relatively easy gains to 
be had at the beginning of the poverty reduction process.
Figure 1: Evolution of Poverty in the Philippines and Other East 
Asian Countries, 1980s to Mid-2000s
Note: The evolution of poverty in East Asia is strongly influenced by China, which weighs 
heavily in the regional average.
Source: World Bank, Development Data Platform.
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6methodologies.8 The poverty gap, which measures how 
far households lie below the poverty line, also increased 
from 2000 to 2006 as did poverty severity, which takes 
into account the poverty gap but places a higher weight 
on households that are further away from the poverty 
line. The global food and oil price crisis in 2007 and the 
global financial crisis that followed in 2008 are likely to 
have raised poverty levels further.9
 
3. In addition to the population that lies below 
the national poverty line, a large proportion of the 
population is clustered just above the poverty line. 
Raising the poverty threshold to the international US$2-
a-day poverty line reveals that an additional 19.4 percent 
of the population in 2006 would be classified as poor. 
According to the Medium-Term Philippine Development 
Plan (MTPDP) 2004-2010, 22 percent of the country’s 
population is chronically poor, while 32 percent moves in 
and out of poverty National Economic and Development 
Authority (NEDA, 2004). The large proportion of vulnerable 
population or “near poor” makes the challenge of poverty 
reduction even more daunting.
8 The poverty headcount indicators in Table 1 represent World Bank staff 
calculations based on FIES data, with poverty lines adjusted in line with the 
consumer price index at the provincial level to render them comparable across 
time.  These indicators differ from the official indicators, which show a decline 
in the overall poverty headcount indicator between 2000 and 2003.  However, 
both measures coincide in showing a marked increase in poverty between 
2003 and 2006.  The World Bank’s US$1.25-a-day threshold indicator and 
Balisacan (2008), both of which use consumption-based measures, also show 
increasing poverty in this period. 
9 The updated poverty figures are scheduled to become available in early 2011. 
World Bank simulations using a micro-macro general equilibrium model 
indicate that the poverty rate will be 0.9 and 1.5 percentage points higher in 
2009 and 2010 as a result of the global crisis than it would have been in the 
absence of the crisis.
4. Progress on the non-income dimensions of poverty 
reduction, as measured by the MDG indicators, has 
been mixed. Considerable progress has been made in 
areas related to child mortality, gender equality, and 
water supply and sanitation. However, the Philippines has 
fallen behind in critical areas such as universal access to 
primary education, with the net enrollment rate at the 
elementary level declining since 2002 and net enrollment 
rates at the secondary level leveling out to between 58-
60 percent over the past five years. Based on progress 
to date, the MDGs for maternal health and reproductive 
health are unlikely to be achieved by 2015. The maternal 
mortality rate in 2006 was 162 deaths per 100,000 live 
births, which is high for a country at the Philippines’ level 
of development. Malnutrition also remains a major issue, 
with the Philippines being among 20 countries in the 
world with the highest burden of child malnutrition.10 
5. The Philippines exhibits a very unequal—and possibly 
worsening—distribution of income and consumption. 
The World Bank’s Development Data Platform currently 
identifies the Philippines as having the most unequally 
distributed income (or consumption) among the East 
Asian middle-income countries, whether measured by 
the Gini coefficient or the relative shares earned by the 
richest and lowest quintiles of the population (Table 2). 
The evidence on the evolution of income distribution is 
less clear. Table 2 indicates no change in the Gini coefficient 
for the Philippines since the early 1990s and a modest 
increase in the relative quintile share, while the rest of 
the region exhibits declines in both. Meanwhile, the FIES 
10 See NEDA-UNDP, Philippines Midterm Progress Report on the Millennium 
Development Goals, 2007.
Table 1:  Poverty Estimates Based on Constant (2006) National Poverty Line
Poverty Headcount
(% of population)
Poverty Gap
(% of poverty line)
Poverty Severity
(% of poverty line)
2000 2003 2006 2000 2003 2006 2000 2003 2006
Urban 16.8 17.3 19.5 4.6 4.7 5.4 1.8 1.8 2.2
Rural 44.7 44.4 45.9 14.0 14.4 14.6 5.9 6.3 6.2
Philippines 31.0 31.1 32.9 9.4 9.6 10.0 3.9 4.1 4.2
Poverty headcount based on official estimates
Philippines 33.0 30.0 32.9
Note: The estimates of poverty incidence are calculated on the basis of per capita income. For details on how the indices were 
computed, please refer to Annex I.
Source: World Bank estimates based on FIES 2000, 3003, 2006.
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7Table 2:  Inequality in Selected East Asian Countries, 1990-2008
Gini coefficients
(averages, %)
Hi-Lo quintile shares*
(ratios; latest year)
1990-95 2002-08 1990-95 2002-08
China n.a. 42 n.a. 8.4
Indonesia n.a. 39 n.a. 6.7
Malaysia 49 38 12.2 6.9
Philippines 44  44 8.3 9.0
Thailand 45 42 9.4 8.0
Vietnam 36 39 5.6 6.4
Sample Average 44 41 8.9 7.6
*The Hi-Lo quintile shares refer to share of total income (or consumption) received by the richest quintile divided by the share of the poorest 
quintile; n.a. = not available.
Source: World Bank Development Data Base; based on household income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure)
data indicates that overall income inequality has been 
declining since 2000. However, as discussed below, the 
national accounts and associated circumstantial evidence 
suggest that the distribution of income has worsened 
over the last decade once the richest households, which 
are usually under-represented in household surveys, are 
taken into account. 
6. Non-income indicators also reveal a high level of 
inequality in the Philippines. Large inequalities in health 
and education outcomes and in access to services persist 
across regions and income groups. In health, for example, 
one child in a thousand died between ages 1-5 among the 
wealthiest quintile of the population, compared to 25 per 
thousand in the poorest quintile and 33 per thousand in 
the ARMM. Similar disparities can be seen in education, 
with 82.9 percent of children 16 years or younger in the 
poorest quintile being in school compared to 98.0 in the 
richest quintile. In ARMM, only 78 percent of children 
16 years or younger attended school, compared to the 
national average of 90.2 percent and the NCR average 
of 94.3 percent. These discrepancies indicate a highly 
unequal distribution of human capital that becomes 
reflected in unequal earnings.
B. Why Has Poverty Not Been Declining in 
Recent Years?
7. Broadly speaking, increases in poverty must either be 
due to declines in average real income (or consumption), 
a worsening distribution of income or a shift of the 
poverty line. That is, standard measures of poverty 
are determined by (i) the mean level of income, (ii) the 
distribution around that mean, and (iii) where the poverty 
line is drawn. The poverty headcount ratio in Table 1 is 
based on a constant poverty line. The increase in poverty 
observed between 2003 and 2006, therefore, would either 
have to be due to an absence of growth (resulting in falling 
incomes and consumption) or to a significant worsening of 
the distribution of income, or both. Compelling evidence 
can be found in favor of both explanations.11 
8. The absence of more dynamic economic growth, 
coupled with high degrees of income inequality, partly 
explains why poverty failed to decline since 2000. As 
noted at the beginning of this report, the absence of 
economic growth has a long-standing history in the 
Philippines, and the growth episode registered since 
2000 has been modest by regional standards. Once the 
data biases discussed below are accounted for, economic 
growth in the Philippines is likely to have been even more 
modest than is indicated in the National Accounts. At the 
same time, the relatively high degree of income inequality 
exhibited by the Philippines has the effect of reducing the 
income elasticity of poverty, posing a further barrier to 
faster poverty reduction.12  
11 This conclusion is similar to one arrived at in the World Bank’s last Philippines 
Poverty Assessment (World Bank, 2001b). After contrasting the evolution of 
poverty in the Philippines and other middle-income countries in East Asia 
over 1985-97, it states (para. 2.6), “This begs the question: has slower poverty 
reduction been on account of slower growth in the Philippines or rather due 
to growth being less pro-poor?  The evidence based on household survey 
data suggests that probably both factors have been at work.”
12 To appreciate this difference, note that it would take 20 years to cut the 
Philippine poverty rate in half with an annual per capita income growth rate 
of 2.5 percent and the growth elasticity of -1.3 estimated for the Philippines. 
The time to achieve this target would be reduced to 10 years with an annual 
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89. The failure of poverty to decline after 2000 also appears 
linked to a worsening distribution of income. As argued 
below, the National Accounts-based figures are likely 
to have over-estimated income growth, while the FIES 
household survey-based figures are likely to have under-
estimated consumption growth and poverty reduction. 
However, the corroborating evidence indicates that, on 
balance, aggregate economic growth was positive and 
that poverty did not decline. That is, data on the growth 
of exports, corporate profits, and fiscal revenues and 
enterprise surveys all point toward positive economic 
growth during 2003-06. Meanwhile, the Social Weather 
Station reports, which regularly monitor perception 
data, corroborate the findings from the survey-based 
data that poverty and the incidence of hunger have 
been increasing in that period. These findings imply 
that the modest growth that did take place during 
2003-06 must have been associated with a deteriorating 
distribution of income.   
10. Several factors have contributed to the worsening 
distribution of income. They include: (i) an unequal 
sectoral distribution of growth, which slows progress in 
poverty reduction when the poor are concentrated in the 
sectors that are stagnating or contracting; (ii) an unequal 
spatial or regional distribution of growth, which has a 
similar effect as the unequal sectoral growth when the 
poor are concentrated in declining or stagnating regions 
growth rate of 5 percent, leaving everything else the same, or to 12 years if 
only the growth elasticity were -2.3 (which is the estimated average elasticity 
for all East Asian countries).
and population mobility is limited; (iii) strong demographic 
pressures, reflecting relatively high population growth 
rates; (iv) declines in the relative price of labor provided 
by the poor; and (v) an unequal distribution of human 
capital and access to social services and, in some cases, a 
decline of public spending on social services that mainly 
benefit the poor. These factors are described in more 
detail below.
C. The Puzzle of Diverging Per Capita 
Income Measures in the Philippines 
11. While the National Accounts point to a significant 
improvement in GDP growth over 2000-06, the Philippines 
household survey data indicates that average real 
income has steadily declined during this period. The FIES, 
from which the poverty indicators are drawn, indicate that 
average real per capita consumption declined annually by 
an average rate of 1.4 percent between 2000 and 2006 
(Table 3). This finding is consistent with the commonly 
observed negative relationship between poverty and 
consumption or income growth, and it squarely attributes 
the absence of progress in poverty reduction to an absence 
of growth. The National Accounts-based data, however, 
indicate that per capital consumption and GDP have been 
growing by well over 2 percent per annum during this 
period, so the failure of poverty to decline must be due to 
a substantial deterioration in the distribution of income. 
That is, it would mean that the benefits of growth since 
2000 have accrued mostly to a sub-sample of mainly 
richer households that is not fully captured by the FIES. 
Table 3:  Per Capita Income and Expenditures in the Philippines (in Constant Pesos)
(Average annual growth rates, %)
1985-1997 2000-03 2003-06 2000-06
                                                                                                          Household Survey-based growth rates
Expenditures per capita 2.7 -0.9 -0.5 -0.7
Income per capita n.a. -1.7 -1.2 -1.4
                                                                                                         National Accounts-based growth rates
Consumption per capita 1.7 2.3 3.5 2.9
GDP per capita 1.4 1.7 3.6 2.7
Sources: Household survey-based figures are based on the FIES; figures up to 1997 are from World Bank (2001b), Philippines 
Poverty Assessment; figures as of 2000 are from the Philippines National Statistics Office. The National Accounts-based growth 
rates are from the World Bank Development Database.
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912. Ascertaining the nature of income and consumption 
growth during periods of rising poverty has important 
policy implications. If the survey-based findings that 
average real per capita consumption and income have 
been falling are taken at face value, the main challenge 
facing policymakers is to bring about faster growth. If the 
National Accounts-based findings that average per capita 
income has been increasing are taken at face value, the 
accompanying rise in poverty indicates that policymakers 
also have to be concerned about the distributional 
consequences of growth and ensure that it is sufficiently 
broad-based.
13. The divergence in the survey-based and National 
Accounts-based data is not unique to the Philippines. As 
noted by Deaton (2005) in his comprehensive review of 
cross-country and inter-temporal relationships between 
survey and national accounts estimates of consumption 
expenditures per capita, “National Accounts estimates 
of consumption [levels] are typically, although not 
always, larger than survey-based estimates, and there is 
a tendency, both across countries and over time within 
important countries, for the NA estimate of consumption 
to grow more rapidly than does the survey-based 
estimate.” Moreover, the differences in levels and growth 
rates are not trivial: Deaton finds that the ratio of survey-
based consumption levels to National Accounts-based 
consumption averages 86 percent worldwide (82 percent 
in East Asia and the Pacific countries). Furthermore, while 
the annual growth of survey-based real consumption 
averaged between 1.9 and 2.3 percent over 1990-2000, 
the National Accounts yielded an average growth rate 
between 3.8 and 4.5, which is twice as large. Finally, it 
should be noted that there is no general presumption 
of greater accuracy in favor of either the surveys or the 
national accounts,13 as both exhibit significant biases. 
14. What is unusual about the Philippines’ experience 
after 2000 is that the survey-based data exhibits 
lower growth (and rising poverty), just as the National 
Accounts exhibit a significant increase in growth. Deaton 
and Dupriez (2009) noted that while the survey-based and 
national accounts-based consumption figures may diverge 
significantly from each other, their year-to-year variation 
13 As Deaton (2005) points out, there is no reason to presume that both data 
sources should yield the same figures considering that the National Accounts 
are designed to track money (or macroeconomic aggregates), while the 
household surveys are designed to track people and estimates of poverty.
is highly correlated. In a separate cross-country analysis 
using data for Latin America and the Caribbean, Perry et al 
(2006) reached the same conclusion when they regressed 
income growth according to the household surveys on 
income growth according to the national accounts, which 
yielded the following estimated regression line: y = 0.977x 
– 0.864. That is, the estimated slope of this regression line 
is very close to 1, so changes in national accounts-based 
growth are generally associated with equal changes in 
survey-based growth. In contrast, the recent experience of 
the Philippines suggests a negative relationship between 
both variables; that is, as the National Accounts show 
an increase in average annual per capita consumption 
growth from 1.7 percent over 1985-97 to 2.9 percent over 
2000-06, the average survey-based per-capita growth rate 
declined from 2.7 percent to -0.7 percent.
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15. The divergence in the survey-based and National 
Accounts-based growth pattern is most pronounced in 
the National Capital Region (NCR). The household survey-
based income growth figures and the National Accounts-
based GDP growth figures also exhibit a large divergence 
across the 16 regions in the Philippines: both sets of figures 
are uncorrelated, yielding an R-squared of less than 0.001. 
This lack of correlation is especially pronounced for the 
NCR, which shows an overall decline in survey-based per 
capita income of 20.6 percent between 2000 and 2006 
and an overall increase in GDP per capita of 26.7 percent 
over the same period.14 
16. The FIES most likely underestimates the growth of 
real household consumption and poverty reduction 
since 2000. Deaton and Dupriez (2009) notes that the 
main source of bias in household surveys worldwide is 
that they are not fully representative because the more 
affluent households are typically under-represented in 
survey samples and also more reluctant to disclose their 
full incomes.15  This means that true income growth is 
likely to be higher than the data suggest. One telling sign 
that the household surveys in the Philippines may not be 
capturing the top end of the income distribution is that 
according to the FIES data, total household income of the 
top decile in 2006 was only P620,000 (about US$12,400), 
or P124,000 (about US$2,700) in per capita terms. This 
would mean that the top decile earned just a little above the 
minimum wage,16 which is roughly equal to the expected 
income of a new graduate entering the labor force. Even 
though the FIES survey data may have underestimated 
household consumption growth, however, the finding 
14 The large divergence in the NCR growth figures may be reflecting the 
rapid growth of profits in the Filipino corporate sector, which is largely 
concentrated in Manila and unlikely to be reported in the household survey 
figures for reasons discussed in paragraph 54.  When NCR is excluded from 
the regressions, the cross-regional correlation is positive, but still weak, with 
an R-squared of 0.08.
15 This sampling bias is particularly important for countries with very unequal 
distributions of income, such as the Philippines. As noted in World Bank 
(2005a), pg. 16, the Philippines continues to stand out as a country with 
an unusually high concentration of family control over firms. In the mid-
1990s, the top 15 families controlled over 50 percent of the stock market 
capitalization in the Philippines, which represents an ownership share 
equivalent to roughly 17 percent of Philippine GDP. Just leaving out these 15 
families from the household survey would result in a major omission in the 
estimation of average household income figures.
16 In 2006, the daily minimum wage in the National Capital Region was around 
P340 for non-agricultural workers; in 2008, it was around P375 (Source: 
National Wages and Productivity Commission).  
that poverty incidence has increased during that period 
is corroborated by independent perception surveys such 
as the Social Weather Station reports and by the decline 
in average real wages. 
17. The National Accounts, in turn, are likely to be 
over-estimating real consumption and GDP growth, 
primarily on account of measurement conventions in 
the compilation of national accounts. These conventions 
exclude most non-exchanged services, such as home food 
preparation or home repairs, and the failure to capture 
intermediate consumption. As people become richer, 
they tend to substitute market-bought services for home-
produced services (that are not captured in the national 
accounts), which biases estimated growth upward. While 
household surveys also tend to exclude non-exchanged 
services, Deaton (2005) identifies three important non-
exchanged items of consumption that are included in the 
national accounts but not in the survey: imputed rents to 
homeowners, indirectly imputed financial services, and 
consumption by non-profit institutions serving households. 
Their inclusion in the compilation of the national accounts 
but not in the survey data contributes further to the 
divergence in the national accounts-based and survey-
based expenditure data. In addition, Medalla and Jandoc 
(2008) have pointed to shortcomings in the quality of the 
National Accounts in the Philippines, which also appear 
to have contributed to an overestimation of GDP growth. 
As noted earlier, however, even though the National 
Accounts-based data may have over-estimated economic 
growth since 2000, the overall evidence suggests that 
growth has nevertheless been positive during this period, 
which means that its limited impact on poverty gives cause 
for concern.
D. Profile of the Poor
18. The preceding findings suggest that growth in 
the Philippines has not been sufficiently strong and 
sustained to make a significant dent in poverty and that 
the modest growth that did occur in recent years has 
largely bypassed the poor. Therefore, reducing poverty 
in a sustained manner will require both more dynamic 
economic growth as well as growth that is more inclusive 
than that experienced in the first half of this decade. This 
section presents a brief profile of the poor, describing 
who they are and where they live and work, as a first step 
toward identifying the types of policies and interventions 
that are needed to make growth more inclusive.
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Table 4:  Profile of the Poor in the Philippines, 2006
Out of 100 Filipinos… Out of 100 POOR Filipinos…
51 live in rural areas 71 live in rural areas
18 do not have access to electricity 40 do not have access to electricity
52 do not have their own water source 78 do not have their own water source
85 belong to male-headed households 90 belong to male-headed households
52 belong to families with more than five membersa 71 belong to families with more than five membersa
35 belong to families whose head works in agriculture 59 belong to families whose head works in agriculture
44 belong to families whose household heads are informal 
sector  workersb 
55 belong to families whose household heads are informal 
sector workersb
15 belong to families with unemployed household heads 8 belong to families with unemployed household heads
3 belong to families whose household heads did not 
attend school
6 belong to families whose household heads did not 
attend school
44 belong to families whose heads did not reach high 
school
66 belong to families whose heads did not reach high 
school
a The average family size at the national level is five. 
b Informal sector workers as used here include (i) informal sector operators who are either self-employed without any paid employee or employer in 
own-family operated farm or business (NSO, 2009) and (ii) workers who do not receive wages from own family-operated farm or business.
Source: World Bank estimates based on the 2006 FIES.
19. Poor Filipinos differ from the rest of the population 
along various dimensions. Table 4 shows how the poor 
are distributed spatially and sectorally relative to the 
population as a whole. It also shows how poor families 
differ from the average Filipino family in terms of 
household characteristics and access to basic services. In 
particular, the poor are concentrated in rural areas and in 
agriculture, have less access to basic services, lower levels 
of education, and larger families. 
Geographic location
20. While rural areas continue to be home to most of 
the poor, the gap between rural and urban poverty 
has declined. The share of the poor population living in 
rural areas has declined since 2000, but rural poverty still 
comprised 70.8 percent of all the poor in 2006 (Table 5). 
The rural-urban shares of the overall population have 
not changed much since 2000, as the population has 
remained split almost equally between rural and urban 
areas. However, increases in the poverty incidence in 
urban areas as well as in the share of the poor population 
living in these areas have reduced the gap between 
urban and rural poverty. The poverty gap and poverty 
severity in urban areas have also worsened since 2000.
Poverty Headcount
(% of population)
Share of the Poor
(% of poor population)
 Population Share
(% of population)
Change in Per 
Capita Income (%)
 2000 2003 2006 2000 2003 2006 2000 2003 2006 2000-2006
Urban 16.8 17.3 19.5 26.8 27.3 29.2 49.4 49.1 49.3 -11.0
Rural 44.8 44.4 45.9 73.2 72.7 70.8 50.6 50.9 50.7 -1.4
Table 5:  Rural and Urban Poverty in the Philippines, 2000-2006
   Source:  World Bank estimates based on FIES data.
P H I L I P P I N E S  F o s t e r i n g  M o r e  I n c l u s i v e  G r o w t h
12
21. The ARMM, Caraga, and Bicol continue to be the 
poorest regions of the country (Table 6). All three of these 
regions had poverty headcount rates of over 50 percent in 
2006. The Mindanao regions, with the exception of Davao, 
had poverty rates of more than 40 percent. Although the 
Zamboanga Peninsula, Northern Mindanao, and Caraga have 
recorded improvements in poverty incidence, they continue 
to account for a disproportionate share of total poverty. 
For example, the Mindanao regions together account for 
32 percent of poverty but only for 23 percent of the total 
population. In contrast, the NCR, home to about 15 percent 
of the population, accounts for less than 5 percent of total 
poverty. However, poverty incidence in the NCR has risen 
steadily since 2000.
22. The regions with the lowest poverty incidence 
have higher degrees of economic activity. The NCR 
contributed 37.2 percent of national GDP in 2006 and 
had the lowest regional poverty headcount rate at 10.4 
percent (Figure 2). Southern Luzon, which makes the second 
highest contribution to national GDP, also has one of the 
lowest poverty headcount ratios. However, it is noteworthy 
that the regions that experienced the greatest reductions 
in poverty between 2000 and 2006 were not necessarily 
the ones that enjoyed the fastest economic growth during 
this period.
Employment and income
23. Poverty is much more prevalent among agricultural 
households than among non-agricultural households. In 
2006, poverty incidence among agricultural households, 
defined here as households with total income from 
agricultural activities equal to or greater than income earned 
from non-agricultural activities, was three times higher 
than poverty incidence among non-agricultural households. 
Poverty incidence among households whose family heads 
were employed in mining and quarrying were almost as high 
as in agriculture, while poverty rates were lowest among 
households whose family heads were employed in finance or 
public utilities.
24. The majority of the poor are engaged in the informal 
sector. According to the 2006 Labor Force Survey (LFS) and 
FIES data, nearly 60 percent of poor workers are in the informal 
sector. Poor households tend to be headed by individuals 
who are working without pay in their own family-operated 
businesses or who are self-employed without any employees, 
which is not surprising since this category includes many poor 
rural farmers. The fact that the poor are concentrated in the 
low-productivity agricultural sector, which can be seriously 
affected by natural disasters, and in informal jobs indicates 
that the poor face higher vulnerability from income and labor 
market shocks than the non-poor.
                                     Poverty Headcount
 (% of population)
Share of the Poor
(% of poor population)
Population Share
(% of population)
Change in Per 
Capita Income (%)
 2000 2003 2006 2000 2003 2006 2000 2003 2006 2000-06
Region I – Ilocos 30.3 28.5 32.7 5.2 4.8 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 -8.8
Region II – Cagayan 25.5 25.2 25.6 2.9 2.8 2.6 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.22
Region III – Cen. Luzon 15.1 17.3 20.6 4.9 6.1 6.9 10.1 11.1 11.0 2.9
Region IV – Sou. Luzon 22.3 25.1 27.2 10.6 12.9 13.0 14.7 16.1 15.8 -9.4
Region V- Bicol 50.8 49.2 51.1 10.3 9.6 9.6 6.3 6.1 6.2 1.1
Region VI – W. Visayas 42.5 39.8 38.6 11.1 9.7 9.0 8.1 7.6 7.7 -2.1
Region VII – C. Visayas 36.5 34.9 35.3 8.5 8.2 8.0 7.2 7.4 7.5 5.5
Region VIII – E. Visayas 49.2 47.2 48.6 7.5 7.2 7.1 4.7 4.7 4.8 3.6
Region IX - Zamboanga 48.0 51.0 45.4 6.3 6.0 5.1 4.0 3.6 3.7 13.7
Region X – N.Mindanao 39.3 44.3 43.2 4.6 6.4 6.0 3.7 4.5 4.6 -0.9
Region XI – Davao 38.2 36.5 36.6 8.5 5.7 5.3 6.9 4.9 4.7 -5.0
Region XII – SOCCSKSARGEN 46.9 40.8 40.8 5.3 5.7 5.3 3.5 4.3 4.3 0.7
Region XIII – NCR 5.8 6.9 10.4 2.7 3.0 4.2 14.4 13.5 13.2 -20.6
Region XIV – CAR 32.4 32.6 34.5 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 9.1
Region XV – ARMM 53.5 51.0 61.9 5.2 5.3 6.4 3.0 3.3 3.4 -16.8
Region XVI – Caraga 51.4 55.2 52.6 4.5 4.6 4.2 2.7 2.6 2.6 8.4
Philippines 31.0 31.1 32.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 -8.2
Source:  World Bank estimates based on FIES data.
Table 6:  Poverty by Administrative Region in the Philippines, 2000-2006
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Figure 2:  Poverty and Regional Contribution to National GDP in the Philippines, 2006
Sources: Poverty rates are World Bank estimates based on FIES 2006; Regional GDP data are from National 
Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB).
Central Luzon(7.7%)
NCR (37.2%) + CALABARZON (11.5%)
Central Visayas (6.9%)
Western Visayas (6.9%)
Region X-Cagayan de Oro (4.6%)
Region XI-Davao (4.6%)
Proportion of poor to
Total Provincial Population
<20
20 – 39.9
40 – 59.9
≥60
Regional contribution to national GDP, 2006 
Share in percent(%)
P H I L I P P I N E S  F o s t e r i n g  M o r e  I n c l u s i v e  G r o w t h
14
25.  Poverty in the Philippines appears to be correlated 
more with underemployment than with unemployment. 
In 2006, only 17 percent of the unemployed were poor. 
The fact that the non-poor are disproportionately over-
represented among the unemployed is not surprising, 
since the poor cannot afford to stay out of work for long 
periods. In contrast, Figure 3 shows that poverty incidence 
is correlated with underemployment. 
26. The poor derive most of their income from wages 
and rely more on domestic remittances. Both poor and 
non-poor households derive most of their income from 
wages, although wages comprise a larger share of the 
non-poor’s total income at 45.2 percent. The poor are 
more diversified between wage income (39.5 percent) 
and entrepreneurial incomes at (35.6 percent). Poor 
households are more dependent on domestic remittances 
(5.4 percent of total income), while non-poor households 
are more dependent on remittances from abroad (12.5 
percent).17 That is, poverty incidence among households 
living on foreign remittances is only 6.3 percent, versus 
poverty incidence of 43.6 percent among households that 
rely mainly on domestic remittances (Table 2.12 of the 
Background Papers).
17 The causality between poverty and source of remittances is not clear.  One 
possibility is that the more affluent households are better off because their 
remittance providers succeeded in finding better paying jobs abroad, while 
those of less affluent households have not.
27. The increased share of poor in the services sector 
between 2003 and 2006 might be explained by a net 
transfer of workers into that sector, together with a 
decrease in the average real daily wage in the services 
sector over this period. Between 2003 and 2006, the 
share of the poor whose main source of income was 
wages (primarily non-agricultural wages) increased 
by 2 percentage points. This corresponded to a similar 
reduction in the share of poor in agriculture as well as a 
net transition of workers from agriculture and industry to 
the services sector during this period based on panel data. 
Moreover, the average real daily wage for the services 
sector declined by 5 percent during that time period. This 
could have contributed to the increased share of poor 
in the services sector over this time period (from 23.9 
percent to 26.8 percent).18
Household characteristics
28. Poverty rates are higher among households with 
less-educated household heads. The poverty rate for 
households headed by individuals with no education (no 
grade completed) was 65.2 percent in 2006, nearly twice as 
high as the national poverty rate of 32.9 percent (Table 7). 
More than two-thirds of the poor have household heads 
who had no highschool education.
18 See the Background Papers for this Report, Chapter VI, Tables 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 
and 6.10.
Figure 3:  Poverty Incidence and Unemployment/Underemployment, 2006
Note:  Each observation corresponds to the combination of poverty incidence and unemployment/underemployment observed in a 
particular region.
Source: World Bank estimates based on FIES and LFS 2006 
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Source: World Bank estimates based on the 2006 FIES.
Table 7:  Poverty by Education Level of Household Head, 2000-2006
 Poverty Headcount(% of population)
Share of the Poor
(% of population)
Population Share
(% of population)
 2000 2003 2006 2000 2003 2006 2000 2003 2006
No grade completed 58.2 62 65.2 6.9 5.6 4.8 3.7 2.8 2.4
Some elementary 49.9 52.1 52.2 35.3 36.8 34.9 22.0 22.0 22.0
Elementary completed 38.3 38.8 43.8 26.5 25.6 26.2 21.5 20.5 19.6
Some high school 34.2 33.7 37.0 13.3 13.9 14.4 12 12.9 12.8
High school completed 21.2 20.3 22.8 14.2 13.9 15.2 20.8 21.3 21.9
Some college 9.5 9.7 10.8 3.3 3.5 3.8 10.7 11.2 11.5
College completed 1.7 2.5 2.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 9.1 9.2 9.5
Postgraduate 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.2
29. As in many other countries, larger households in 
the Philippines tend to be poorer. Poverty incidence 
steadily increases with household size, with nearly half 
of households with seven or more members living below 
the poverty line (Table 8). In 2006, more than half of 
households with three of more children were poor, and 
nearly two-thirds of poor households had three or more 
children. On average, women in the wealthiest quintile 
have only two children, compared to nearly six births for 
poor women—one of the widest disparities in the East 
Asian region (NSO and Macro International (MI), 2003). 
In contrast, the fertility rate for women in the poorest 
quintile is 2.2 in Vietnam, 3.0 in Indonesia, and 4.7 in 
Cambodia. A regression analysis shows that household 
size is one of the most important determinants of poverty 
in the Philippines, with larger households and households 
with higher ratios of children and elderly tending to have 
lower per capita expenditures. The country’s dependent 
population still exceeds the working-age population, 
resulting in a relatively high dependency ratio within 
households.
Table 8:  Poverty by Household Size and Number of Children, 2000-2006
 
Poverty Headcount
(% of population)
Share of the Poor
(% of population)
Population Share
(% of population)
 2000 2003 2006 2000 2003 2006 2000 2003 2006
Household size
1 member 7.6 6.3 4.6 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.7 1.0 1.0
2 10.8 9.7 10.6 1.2 1.4 1.4 3.4 4.4 4.4
3 12.9 13.5 14.2 3.4 4.5 4.3 8.2 10.4 9.9
4 17.0 19.3 19.8 8.0 10.7 10.2 14.7 17.2 16.9
5 24.3 26.7 29.7 14.8 16.7 17.5 18.8 19.4 19.4
6 33.5 35.3 38.2 19.4 18.9 19.7 18.0 16.7 17.0
7+ members 45.4 47.9 49.1 53.0 47.6 46.8 36.2 30.9 31.4
Number of Children
0 child 11.2 10.7 11.7 6.6 6.2 6.8 18.3 17.9 19.2
1 15.0 15.2 18.3 8.7 9.4 11.1 17.9 19.1 20.0
2 23.6 24.3 26.7 14.8 16.8 17.6 19.4 21.5 21.6
3+ children 48.8 50.8 54.2 69.9 67.7 64.5 44.4 41.5 39.1
Philippines 31.0 31.1 32.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 Source:  World Bank estimates based on FIES data.
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30. The link between household size and poverty is 
particularly significant in the Philippines due to its high 
population growth rate. Despite a modest decline in 
fertility rates over the last few decades, the country’s 
population growth rate remains among the highest in the 
region (Figure 4). The annual population growth rate in the 
Philippines is 2.0 percent, compared to an average rate 
of 0.8 percent in East Asia and the Pacific and 1.2 percent 
for lower middle-income countries worldwide (NSO 2008; 
World Bank Development Data Platform). While total 
fertility rates have declined from 4.1 births per woman 
on average in 1991 to 3.3 births in 2006 (NSO and USAID, 
2009), this decline is among the slowest in Southeast Asia. 
As shown in Table 8, over 30 percent of the population 
belong to households with seven or more members.
31. Evidence indicates that the continued high fertility 
among the poor may be hindering poverty reduction. 
Although it can be difficult to disentangle the extent to 
which high fertility and population growth is a cause or 
consequence of slow progress in poverty reduction, a 
convincing range of macro and micro evidence suggests that 
continued high fertility by the poor has affected progress in 
poverty reduction in the Philippines (Racelis, 2008). At the 
macroeconomic level, simulation models using economic 
and demographic data for the Philippines showed that 
higher population growth lowered GDP per capita (Orbeta, 
2002). Similar models also found that while expenditures on 
human capital rise with population growth, the increases 
are not sufficient to maintain per capita expenditure levels 
(Orbeta, 2002). The growth of provincial per capita income 
is negatively correlated with the proportion of young 
dependents in the province (Mapa, Balisacan, and Briones, 
2006). At the household level, large family size is strongly 
correlated with higher poverty incidence, lower savings 
and asset accumulation, and reduced per capita household 
expenditures for education and health (Orbeta, 2002; 
Orbeta, 2005; Racelis 2008). The issue of population growth 
is discussed in greater detail in Parts II and III below.
32. The preceding analysis underscores the challenges 
in ensuring that growth in the Philippines is broad-
based and inclusive. These findings point to a number 
of challenges in reducing poverty in thePhilippines, 
including rapid population growth, dependence 
on agriculture, insufficient wage-earning opportunities, 
imbalances across urban/rural and geographic regions, 
and low educational attainment levels. To tackle these 
barriers, enhancing the income opportunities of the poor 
and improving their ability to participate in markets will 
be critical. 
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations 
Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp. Population 
projections based on Medium Fertility Assumptions. 
Figure 4: Population Growth Rates, 1970-2025
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“To generate better income opportunities in 
lagging regions and sectors of the economy, it is 
best to integrate them with the leading ones.”
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Part 2    Enhancing Income Opportunities
33. Accelerating growth is essential for poverty reduction. As argued earlier, poverty has failed 
to decline significantly since the East Asian Crisis due to insufficiently dynamic growth, a high 
degree of income inequality that reduces the income elasticity of poverty reduction, and an 
apparent worsening of the income distribution. The first step toward addressing this failure is to 
accelerate growth, which will not be easy in the short run while the global slowdown continues to 
run its course. Moreover, even though the global crisis is gradually bottoming out, the post-crisis 
external environment is likely to be much less favorable than before, which threatens to leave 
the Philippine economy on a lower growth plateau in the absence of reforms. This adds further 
urgency to the removal of growth constraints that already existed before the crisis, and which are 
examined below.
A.  The Key Constraints to Economic Growth
34. From a sector development perspective, per capita GDP can be increased by: (i) raising the 
productivity of workers within sectors and (ii) reallocating workers (and other factors of production) 
from lower- to higher-productivity sectors.19 In the post-World War II period, the sectors with high 
productivity worldwide have tended to be those that produce tradables—within this category, it is 
generally the industrial goods, although tradable services are becoming increasingly important. The 
least productive sectors, in turn, have tended to be associated with traditional agriculture and the 
informal services sectors. This sector ranking by labor productivity is also observed in the Philippines, 
where the industry sector is the most productive, followed by services and agriculture as the least 
productive (Figure 5). Historically, the most rapidly growing developing economies were those 
that were able to shift their labor force from the agriculture sector to the industry sector without 
sacrificing the latter’s labor productivity levels.20 
19 A third way is by raising the ratio of workers to population, either through increased labor participation or reduced dependency ratios, 
but there are natural limitations to the potential growth impulse arising from this source.
20 In this discussion, the reference to industrial activity serves as a proxy for non-traditional, technologically more advanced production. 
Although such production also includes technologically sophisticated agricultural and service sub-sectors, most of it has tended to be 
concentrated in the industry sector. The focus on industry, therefore, is entirely due to limitations in the classification of data, which is 
only readily available in the traditional agriculture/services/industry disaggregation.
Figure 5: Labor Productivity in the Philippines
Source:  World Bank, based on  Labor Force Surveys
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35. The Philippines has been exhibiting a slower structural 
transformation than other East Asian countries. Although 
its share of total employment devoted to agriculture 
has continued to decline over the last 20 years (Figure 
6), the share of labor released from that sector has not 
been absorbed by industry. Rather, this labor was entirely 
absorbed by the services sector, which displays significantly 
lower labor productivity levels than industry. Had the 
labor that was released from agriculture been absorbed 
by industry, annual economic growth in the Philippines 
would have been around 0.7 percentage points faster, (see 
Technical Annex I Scenario B). At the same time, the levels of 
labor productivity growth within each sector have remained 
largely unchanged (Figure 5) except for a surge after 2002, 
which largely reflects temporary increases in capacity 
utilization during the economic expansion of 2003-07.21  
36. One manifestation of the Philippines’ uneven 
structural transformation is the slow growth of 
industry sector employment. The other East Asian 
economies were able to absorb the workers released 
from their primary sectors at a much faster pace than 
the Philippines (Figure 7). Between 1980 and 2005, the 
Philippines managed to double the size of its industrial 
labor force, but the other middle-income economies in 
the region almost tripled theirs. At the same time, the 
other economies were able to increase labor productivity 
within manufacturing at a much faster pace than the 
21 Had sector productivity growth rates in the Philippines been as fast as in other 
East Asian countries (Technical Annex I, Scenario C), overall annual output per 
worker would have grown 1.3 percentage points faster. 
Philippines (Figure 8). That is, they succeeded both in 
transferring more workers into the industry sector and 
in continually raising the level of productivity within 
the sector. In doing so, they have been able to achieve 
significantly higher rates of economic growth.
37. The expansion of tradables or industrial production, 
in particular, is empirically associated with faster 
economic growth. There are at least two schools of 
thought on why tradables are important for growth: one 
focuses on the act of trading, and the other focuses on 
the act of producing tradable goods and services. The 
first viewpoint holds that there are learning or other spill-
over effects from exporting because of technological or 
marketing externalities that are created when exporters 
Source:  LFS, various rounds.
Figure 6:  Sector Employment Shares, 1987-2008
1987
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2003 2006
Industry
Services
Agriculture
Sh
ar
e 
to
 T
ot
al
 E
m
pl
oy
m
ne
t 
(%
)
Source: World Bank, Development Data Platform
Figure 7: Evolution of Industrial Employment, 
1980-2004
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Figure 8: Labor Productivity in Manufacturing, 
1980-2004
Source: World Bank, Development Data Platform
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the Philippines. About two-thirds of that difference (1.6 
percent) was due to faster physical capital accumulation 
and the remainder (0.7 percent) was to due higher total 
factor productivity growth.23 Differences in human capital 
accumulation, on the other hand, do not appear to have 
played a significant role.
Identifying the main constraints to growth 
in the Philippines
39. Economic growth in the Philippines has been held 
back by low investment and limited factor mobility. The 
factor accumulation approach draws attention to the low 
level of investment in physical capital as a key difference 
in the rapid growth observed in other countries in East 
Asia compared to the Philippines. This suggests that the 
problem of slow growth may be due to inadequate public 
investment and a poor investment climate for the private 
sector. The sector development approach, in turn, draws 
attention to the slow pace of structural transformation 
in the economy. This suggests that there may be barriers 
to factor mobility across sectors, either in the form of 
labor market rigidities, capital market distortions, or anti-
competitive practices that are preventing a more fluid 
market entry and exit of firms. 
23 The difference in total factor productivity growth happens to be very close to 
the growth foregone on account of the incomplete structural transformation 
in the Philippines; see Technical Annex I.  That is, had the Philippines been 
able to fully absorb the labor released by agriculture into the industry sector, 
it would have been able to close about one-third of the average growth gap 
vis-à-vis its three regional neighbors.
have to compete abroad. This makes tradables special, 
since non-tradables cannot be exported. The second 
viewpoint holds that the production of tradables is special, 
independent of whether the products are exported or 
displace imports. The starting premise is that a number of 
different activities with different marginal productivities 
coexist within developing economies at any given time. In 
this context, as more workers shift from low-productivity 
to high-productivity activities, GDP increases independent 
of whether the goods produced are sold domestically or 
abroad.22  Even in the absence of technological externalities 
from export activities, however, it is difficult to envisage a 
significant expansion of tradables production in the absence 
of export markets, given the limited size of the Philippine 
domestic market for achieving economies of scale. 
38. From a factor accumulation perspective, the slow 
growth exhibited by the Philippines relative to other 
economies in the region is mainly explained by a low 
rate of physical capital accumulation, although low rates 
of total factor productivity growth also played a role. As 
shown in the last row of Table 9, the average annual growth 
of output per worker in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand 
over the period 1990-03 was 2.3 percent higher than in 
22 A recent empirical study (Rodrik, 2009) finds that while economic growth is 
positively correlated both with the GDP share of industry and the share of 
exports, the former relationship is stronger and more robust that the latter. 
Insofar as the post-crisis external environment is less accommodating of trade 
surpluses, this is good news for the growth prospects of newly industrializing 
economies. It does not, however, provide support for pursuing an inward-
oriented industrialization strategy.
Table 9: Sources of Growth in Selected East Asian Countries (%), 1990-2003
* output per worker in the Philippines increased significantly during 2004-07, all of which became reflected in an increase in factor productivity and 
with no changes in the contribution of capital.
Source: Bosworth, Barry and Susan Collins (2003) 
  Contribution of:
Output Output per Physical Factor
 Worker Capital Education Productivity
Philippines* 3.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 -0.3
Indonesia 4.1 1.7 1.7 0.5 -0.5
Malaysia 6.2 3.2 2.0 0.5 0.7
Thailand 4.5 3.4 1.9 0.4 1.0
Ave (excl. PHL) 4.9 2.7 1.9 0.5 0.4
            Difference w/PHL 1.7 2.3 1.6 0.1 0.7
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40. To help identify the most binding constraints on 
growth, it is useful to recall the assessment of the 
Philippine economy presented in Krugman, et al. (1992). 
This assessment noted significant problems in several 
areas, especially the presence of high protectionist 
barriers in manufacturing, a low public revenue base, and 
inadequate investment in public infrastructure.24 Such 
an economy, the Krugman team concluded, could only 
count on a very low growth rate—perhaps as low as three 
percent—barely keeping up with population growth. 
This turned out to be a prescient observation, as annual 
GDP growth averaged 3.3 percent over the decade that 
followed (Table 9). A review of economic developments 
in the Philippines since the early 1990s reveals that some 
progress has been made in a few problem areas identified 
by the Krugman, et al. (1992) report, but many others 
remain as relevant today as they were two decades ago. 
41. A number of recent diagnostic studies25 have identified 
the following key constraints to growth in the Philippines: 
(i) a vulnerable fiscal situation due largely to a very 
low public revenue base; (ii) inadequate infrastructure, 
particularly in transport and electricity; and (iii) a weak 
investment climate due largely to governance concerns. 
A number of other constraints have also been mentioned 
as potentially serious obstacles, including shortcomings 
in the financial sector, labor market rigidities, market 
failures in certain sectors, and an inadequate composition 
of skills. However, there appears to be a broad consensus 
that the first three constraints mentioned above are the 
most critical. 
42. The vulnerable fiscal situation constitutes a threat 
to macroeconomic instability and undercuts the 
government’s capacity to intervene in the economy 
and provide essential public services. The East Asian 
financial crisis triggered a precipitous decline in public 
revenues, particularly tax revenues, resulting in widening 
fiscal deficits and a rapidly rising public debt ratio 
24 The Krugman team found that the essential structure of the Philippine 
economy was characterized by a highly inefficient manufacturing sector 
sheltered behind high protective walls and using excessively capital-intensive 
techniques, while the rapidly growing labor force was not being absorbed 
into industrial jobs, but into subsistence agriculture and marginal service-
sector employment. Although the government was found to have done a 
reasonable job of maintaining macroeconomic stability, its limited revenue 
base constrained its ability to undertake socially necessary spending, 
especially on infrastructure, which was very low by regional standards.
25 See World Bank 2005a, 2007; and Asian Development Bank, 2007.
(Figure 9). A series of tax reforms in 2004-05 succeeded 
in temporarily reversing the decline in tax revenues 
and halting the rise in the public debt ratio, but these 
efforts began to weaken again in 2007, putting renewed 
pressure on the fiscal balances. The government was able 
to maintain macroeconomic stability, in part through 
prudent monetary management but also in part through 
the decline in public expenditures (Figure 10), raising 
concerns about the government’s capacity to sustain 
the provision of essential public services. The economic 
slowdown associated with the current global crisis has 
exacerbated the decline in tax revenues and resulted in a 
further buildup of public debt. Restoring the stability and 
integrity of the tax system in the Philippines is essential 
for removing the fears of macroeconomic instability 
that periodically impair the investment climate and for 
providing a sustainable basis for public services.
43. Infrastructure shortcomings in the Philippines are 
particularly pronounced in the transport and power 
sectors. The Global Competitiveness Report for 2009 ranks 
Figure 9:  Public Revenues, 1997-2007
    Source: Bureau of Treasury (BTr)
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 
%
 o
f G
D
P 
Figure 10:  Public Expenditures, 1997-2007
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Table 10: Ranking the Quality of Infrastructure in Selected East Asian Countries
Overall Transport Electricity
Rank (Roads) Rank (Ports) Rank Rank
Malaysia 27 Malaysia 24 Malaysia 19 Malaysia 39
Thailand 41 Thailand 35 Thailand 47 Thailand 41
China 66 China 50 China 61 China 61
Cambodia 82 Cambodia 77 Cambodia 89 Philippines 87
Indonesia 96 Indonesia 94 Indonesia 95 Indonesia 96
Philippines 98 Vietnam 102 Vietnam 99 Vietnam 103
Vietnam 111 Philippines 104 Philippines 112 Cambodia 121
Note: The rankings refer to a total of 133 countries.  Source: World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2009-2010
the Philippines 98th out of 133 countries in terms of the 
quality of its overall infrastructure, ahead of only Vietnam 
among the countries in the region (Table 10).26   In the 
Transport sector, it ranks last in the region. As pointed out 
in the most recent transport sector expenditure review 
(World Bank, 2009a), the Philippines scores lowest on 
the Logistics Performance Index in the East Asia region. 
Even though the quantity of transport infrastructure in 
network and facility density in the Philippines compares 
well with other countries in the region, capacity and 
quality do not. While the Philippines ranks somewhat 
better in the region in terms of electricity quality, it 
still falls far below the world average and is an area 
highlighted in the 2005 investment climate assessment 
as a major negative influence on firms’ productivity and 
investment decisions.
44. The lack of adequate infrastructure in the Philippines 
is indicative of a poor investment climate that reflects 
a weak public investment effort and contributes to 
a poor private investment effort. Compared to other 
countries in the region, the Philippines has relied more 
on the private sector for its capital investment needs. 
Most noteworthy, however, is that the amount of total 
spending on fixed capital formation is significantly less in 
the Philippines than in East Asia and the Pacific on average 
(Figure 11). Moreover, this gap has been increasing since 
the East Asia financial crisis, raising further questions 
26 This represents a deterioration since 2006, when the Philippines was ranked 
88th out of 125 countries.
about the sustainability of economic growth. The drop 
in public investment since the early 1980s was part of a 
deliberate strategy to place more emphasis on private 
participation to satisfy the country’s infrastructure 
needs. After 1997, the drop in public revenues, together 
with poor project preparation and implementation 
capacity, has rendered the country even more reliant on 
private infrastructure investment. Such a strategy puts a 
premium on maintaining a good investment climate for 
private investors. Unfortunately, the investment climate 
in the Philippines has not been sufficiently good to 
attract enough private investors to make up for the gap in 
public investment, while the laudable increases in public 
infrastructure spending between 2007 and 2009 were 
short-lived as the fiscal position deteriorated.
45. Governance-related factors ranked as the main 
impediment to firms’ productivity and investment 
decisions in the 2005 investment climate assessment. 
Payments of administrative bribes and the threat of civil 
unrest, crime and disorder were reported to be among 
the most important barriers to a good investment climate. 
As indicated in Figure 12, the Philippines ranks below the 
world mean in four of the six categories that make up the 
World Bank’s governance indicators. The Philippines ranks 
particularly poorly in the categories of political stability 
and control of corruption, both of which had declining 
scores between 2000 and 2008.
46. Several factors do not appear to be critical constraints 
to growth at this time.  The Krugman, et al. (1992) report 
noted that, as of mid-1990, the trade policy regime 
remained highly biased against trade. Accordingly, it 
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recommended that ‘the nation should pursue a strategy 
of export-led recovery driven by a depreciation of the 
exchange rate, complemented by trade liberalization.’ In 
view of the serious trade deficit and modest export growth 
that prevailed at the end of the 1980s, the challenging 
part was how to introduce trade liberalization without 
immediately generating unsustainable trade deficits. The 
current situation is significantly different in at least two 
respects: trade barriers are much lower than in the early 
1990s, and the current account balance is in surplus even 
though the real exchange rate has been appreciating in 
recent years and is currently above its 1990 level. The main 
factor responsible for this difference is the tremendous 
growth in workers’ remittances. The presence of a current 
account surplus driven by remittances growth means that 
the Philippines is exporting capital and labor, which raises 
questions about the country’s long-run growth prospects. 
The binding constraint on growth does not appear to be 
the availability of capital or labor but the lack of adequate 
domestic incentives to employ that capital and labor at 
home rather than abroad. It is not evident, therefore, 
that a more depreciated exchange rate coupled with 
trade liberalization—as recommended by Krugman, et 
al. (1992)—would make much difference as long as the 
key constraints that depress the investment climate as 
described earlier persist.27
27 A similar argument also applies to the gross domestic savings rate. Currently 
averaging 15 percent of GDP, this rate is very modest compared to the 40 
percent average observed in the East Asia & Pacific region as a whole or 
the 28 percent average for all lower middle-income countries worldwide. 
47. It is difficult to envision the resumption of economic 
growth in a sustained manner in the absence of major 
improvements in the tax collection effort, infrastructure 
investment, and governance. A number of policy options 
and possible reforms to bring about such improvements 
are contained in previous reports (e.g., World Bank, 2005a 
and 2007; International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank, 2007; Asian Development Bank, 2007) and are 
summarized in the concluding section. They are flagged 
here as necessary conditions for resuming growth and 
reducing poverty.
However, this rate is adequate enough to satisfy the current limited demand 
for investment funds in the Philippines so does not seem to be a constraint to 
higher domestic investment spending at this time.
Source: World Bank, Development Data Base.
Figure 11:  Public and Private Fixed Capital Formation, as % of GDP
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Figure 12: The Philippines: Governance Indicators, 
2000 vs. 2008
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48. While resuming growth is essential for 
poverty reduction, the recent experience 
of the Philippines indicates that growth 
must also be rendered more pro-poor. 
As indicated in Part I, the resurgence of 
GDP growth in the first half of this decade 
did little for poverty reduction in the 
Philippines, raising concerns about its 
uneven distributional impact. The next 
section looks at the sectoral, regional, and 
demographic dimensions of growth in the 
Philippines to gain a better understanding of 
what may have caused the impact of growth 
on poverty to be so low in recent years.
B. The Sectoral, Regional and 
Demographic Dimensions of 
Growth and Employment 
49. The sectoral and spatial composition 
of growth matter for poverty reduction. If labor markets 
are strongly segmented across sectors, growth will have 
a larger impact on poverty alleviation if it occurs in the 
sectors where most poor people work. However, even 
without labor market segmentation, uneven sectoral 
growth may result in changes in relative prices (both in 
product and factor markets) that can either favor or hurt 
the poor. For instance, the poor would benefit if rapid 
growth in agriculture led to a reduction in the relative 
price of foods that are consumed more intensively by the 
poor. Alternatively, considering that the poor tend to be 
less endowed with skills, they stand to gain the most from 
increases in the wage for unskilled labor. A growth pattern 
that is biased towards sectors that are most intensive in 
the use of unskilled labor, therefore, would put upward 
pressure on the unskilled wage economy-wide, raising the 
incomes of the poor and thereby reducing poverty more 
than would be the case if all sectors were growing at the 
same uniform rate as GDP.
The sectoral dimensions of growth
50. The sectors that contributed most to GDP growth 
during the last decade have generated few jobs. A 
sector’s potential impact on wages and poverty reduction 
depends on its growth rate and size—which together 
determine its contribution to overall GDP growth—as 
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Figure 13: Sector Contribution to Growth and Employment
Source:  World Bank calculations based on data from the NSCB Philippines Statistical 
Yearbook (various years) 
well as on its unskilled labor-intensity ratio.28 Economic 
growth in recent years has been driven primarily by the 
manufacturing, wholesale & retail trade, and transport & 
communications sectors. These sectors have accounted 
for a sizeable share of GDP, with a combined value-added 
averaging just under 45 percent during 1997-07. Apart 
from wholesale & retail trade, however, these sectors 
have generated little employment. Manufacturing, in 
particular, which contributed around 20 percent to GDP 
growth over 2001-07, only contributed around 5 percent 
to job creation (Figure 13). 
51. The limited employment growth that has taken place 
mainly favored the more educated workers, contributing 
even less to poverty reduction. The pattern of growth 
in the Philippines has been biased against the unskilled 
labor-intensive sectors. The fastest-growing sectors such 
as manufacturing are relatively capital-intensive and skills-
intensive, posing a barrier to employment of the poor in 
these sectors. Although the overall skills level of the labor 
force has improved, the poor are mostly unskilled. Among 
the fastest-growing sectors (manufacturing, wholesale & 
retail trade, and transport & communications), only the 
wholesale & retail trade sector exhibits a positive unskilled 
labor intensity ratio.29 
28 The labor intensity ratio is defined as the ratio of a sector’s share of unskilled 
employment to its share in total GDP, minus one.
29 See Figure 3.5 in Chapter III of the Background Papers.  
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52. Agriculture, which employs the majority of the poor 
and is intensive in the employment of unskilled labor, 
has grown more slowly than other sectors. Its overall 
contribution to total GDP growth was only around 13 
percent over 1997-07 — the same as the transport & 
communications sector, which accounts for a much 
smaller share of GDP. As a result, the share of agriculture 
in GDP fell from 19 to 14 percent over the last 10 years. 
Although agriculture continues to play a significant role as 
the most employment-intensive sector, its employment 
generation record in recent years has been disappointing.
53. The services sector has become the main contributor 
to job creation. Services sector employment grew by 17 
percent between 2001 and 2007, compared to 9.4 percent 
in the agriculture sector and 8.5 percent in manufacturing. 
As shown in Figure 14, the services sector has overtaken 
the agriculture sector to account for the largest share of 
total employment. It accounted for almost 50 percent 
of total employment in 2007, while agriculture and 
manufacturing accounted for 35 percent and 15 percent, 
respectively.
54. As in manufacturing, growth in the services sector 
also has mainly benefited the more skilled workers. 
The services sector is the most skills-intensive, with 
skilled workers comprising 70 percent of its workforce, 
compared to 60 percent in manufacturing and 26 percent 
in agriculture. Given that the more skills-intensive 
services sector has had the highest job creation rate, it is 
not surprising that employment growth has been more 
pronounced among skilled workers. The Labor Force 
Surveys show that total employment of skilled workers 
has increased rapidly: during 2001-07, employment of 
workers with college and high school degrees grew by 
23.4 percent and 25.5 percent, respectively. In contrast, 
employment of workers with no education or a primary 
degree increased by only 3.2 percent and 0.6 percent, 
respectively.
55. The combined growth performance of all sectors in 
recent years has not been strong enough to outweigh the 
negative influence yielded by the uneven sector growth 
pattern. The sectoral composition of growth appears to 
explain in part the observed lack of poverty reduction 
and the decline in real wages in recent years. Based on 
this sectoral pattern, the evolution of unskilled wages 
and changes in poverty can be simulated.30 Simulations 
reveal that despite the positive GDP growth observed 
during most of the period since 1997, there are several 
periods of increase in the poverty headcount index that 
would be explained by the negative contribution of the 
sectoral growth pattern to poverty reduction. For example, 
projected poverty reveals an increase in 2005, despite a 
positive overall growth rate of GDP per worker of about 
2 percent31 (Figure 15). The model predicts a fluctuating 
headcount index that increases slightly over the decade, 
30 See, Chap. 3 of the Background Papers, Box 3.1.
31 The predicted pattern of the headcount index can be obtained using its 
predicted growth rate and initial value. The evolution of changes in the 
headcount index is predicted according to the equation: headcount index 
growth = -1.936 x GDP growth -13.622 x labor intensive growth, where the 
coefficients are obtained based on cross-country regressions (based on 
Loayza and Raddatz, 2006 and Raddatz, 2008).
Figure 14:  Employment Generation, Labor Intensity, and Sector Size
Source:  World Bank calculations based on data from the NSCB Philippines Statistical Yearbook (various years)
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and although the predicted increase is smaller than the 
actual increase, it is still remarkably close. The predicted 
pattern of real unskilled wages shows that unskilled wages 
decline by about 8 percent and experience a 4 percent 
decline during the last few years.32 This is consistent with 
recent data on actual wages, which also show a decline in 
real wages of unskilled labor.
The regional dimensions of growth
56. There are significant differences in income and 
poverty levels across regions in the Philippines. The NCR, 
which accounts for 31 percent of total GDP and only 13 
percent of the entire population, is the richest region in the 
Philippines, with a per capita GDP (in constant 1985 Pesos) 
of P37,855 in 2006.33 This is over two and a half times the 
national average of P14,676. At the other extreme is the 
region of ARMM, with an average per capita GDP of P3,486 
which represents only one-quarter of the national average. 
32 The equation for the evolution of real wages is given by: real wage growth = 
GDP growth +7.03x labor intensive growth, where again the coefficient on 
labor intensive growth is obtained from cross-country regressions. Although 
Loayza and Raddatz (2006) do not directly estimate the parameters of 
the wage equation due to data availability constraints, these parameters 
can be derived from the parameters of the wage equation under certain 
assumptions.
33 NCR is also the most densely populated, with 16,100 persons per km2, 
compared to a national average of 226.
Figure 15:  Simulation Results on Changes in Poverty and Unskilled Wages, 1997-2006
Predicted vs. actual poverty headcount index Predicted evolution of unskilled real wage
Source:  Raddatz (2008)
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The regions of Bicol, Eastern Visayas and Caraga, also rank 
among the poorest regions, with average per capita GDP 
levels of approximately one-half the national average. As 
shown on the left of Figure 16, the regional disparities 
in per capita GDP also are fairly closely and inversely 
correlated with the regional distribution of poverty rates. 
At the extremes, the richest region (NCR) had a poverty 
headcount ratio of 5.8 percent in 2000, while the poorest 
regions (ARMM) had 62 percent.
 
57. The uneven pattern of per capita growth across the 
regions may have contributed to the increase in poverty 
observed during 2003-06. Some regions have exhibited 
increased per capita income growth since 2000, while others 
have reported declines. It is conceivable, therefore, that 
overall poverty stopped declining during 2000-06 due to an 
uneven pattern of growth. When aggregate GDP growth is 
positive, however, this can only happen if the overall income 
distribution across regions worsens. That is, the pattern of 
growth would have to be such that the rich regions are 
becoming richer on average, while the poor regions are 
becoming poorer.34 Such a pattern is observed on the right 
hand side of Figure 16, which shows that the regions with a 
higher per capita GDP in 2000 tended to exhibit faster GDP 
growth during 2000-06.35  
34 See Technical Annex II for an analytical justification.
35 It turns out, however, that the correlation between the poverty headcount 
ratios and per capita GDP growth across regions is insignificant. That is, the 
regions with the highest poverty headcount ratios have generally not tended 
to exhibit slower growth than the regions with lower headcount ratios. This 
result is largely attributable to the statistical divergence problem identified 
 The demographic dimensions of growth
58. The Philippines’ labor market faces difficult 
demographic challenges. As discussed in Section I, the 
Philippines’ population growth rate is among the highest in 
the region. Given that the country is still in the early stages 
of demographic transition, dependency ratios—defined as 
the ratio of children under 15 and adults over 65 divided 
by the total working-age population—are also high. The 
dependency ratio for the Philippines was calculated as 
65 percent in 2005, exceeding the dependency ratios of 
Thailand (by 50 percent), Indonesia (by 27 percent), and 
Malaysia (by 16 percent). 
59. The economy has not created enough jobs to keep 
up with the country’s rapid population growth, and real 
wages have been declining. These population dynamics, 
which have resulted in a continuous increase in the 
working-age population (15-64 years of age), are putting 
tremendous pressure on the labor market, straining the 
economy’s capacity to maintain full employment and 
generate adequate real wage growth. Between 2001 and 
2007, employment grew by 13 percent, while the working-
age population grew by 17.6 percent. Meanwhile, the 
average real wage declined by 5 percent between 2003 and 
2006. This problem is also evident across regions: only three 
regions have been generating employment at a rate higher 
than the increase in working-age population (Figure 17).
earlier (Part 1), given that the poverty headcount ratios are derived from the 
FIES household surveys and the per capita GDP figures are derived from the 
national accounts.  
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Note:  The data points refer to the 16 administrative regions in the Philippines.
Source: FIES 2000; NSCB.
Figure16: Poverty and Economic Performance in the Philippines, by Region
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60. Labor supply pressures have been only partly 
mitigated by a surge of international migration and a 
decline in labor force participation. According to the 
Labor Force Survey, the number of individuals registered 
as Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) doubled during 
2003-2007, reaching 1.9 million individuals in 2007. 
The share of OFWs in the working age population has 
increased from 2.1 percent in 2003 to 3.3 percent in 2007 
(Table 11). At the same time, labor force participation 
rates have declined by 3.0 percentage points if migrants 
are excluded in the calculation and 2.2 percentage points 
if they are included. In particular, labor force participation 
rates among the youngest and most educated workers 
have fallen steadily over time. Compared to other East 
Asian countries, the labor force participation rate in the 
Philippines is low, while the gender gap in labor force 
participation is particularly high, with female labor 
supply being about 30 percentage points lower than 
male labor supply.36 
61. Labor market indicators vary widely across regions, 
especially between the NCR and the other three island 
regions of Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. Moreover, 
these differences are significant even after accounting 
for differences in education attainment and labor market 
experience. The daily wage in the NCR is one-third higher 
than the national average, and real wages have declined 
36 The implications of this high gender gap are not clearly understood at this 
time and deserve further attention.
Table 11:  Trends in Migration and Labor Force Participation, 2003-2007
Source:  LFS, 1997 to 2007 (October rounds).
Year Population of Overseas Filipino Workers Labor  Force Labor Force
15-64 years old (Share of working-age participation rate participation rate
(thousands) population) (excl. migrants) (incl. migrants)
2003 49,900 2.05 62.53 63.83
2004 51,100 2.31 61.64 63.10
2005 52,400 2.57 62.40 64.05
2006 53,600 2.87 61.19 63.00
2007 54,900 3.30 59.56 61.60
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Figure 17:  Employment Generation by Region and Sector, 2001-2007
Note:  The vertical red line represents the increase in working-age population.
Source:  World Bank calculations based on NSCB, Philippines Statistical Yearbook, various years.
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less than in other regions. However, the unemployment 
rate in the NCR is almost double the national average. 
This suggests that individuals in the NCR face tougher 
competition in obtaining jobs but are likely to be better 
remunerated if employed. In contrast, individuals in Ilocos, 
Central Luzon, and Central Visayas face the toughest 
conditions, with low employment/high unemployment 
and low wage levels.
C. Generating Productive Employment 
Opportunities
62. Because the poor are still largely engaged in sectors and 
regions that are not growing or not creating employment, 
generating better income-earning opportunities for the 
poor is critical for poverty reduction. The poor work mainly 
in the low-growth, low-productivity agricultural sector, 
while the capital-intensive and skills-intensive nature of 
the more dynamic sectors makes it difficult for them to 
gain entry. Meanwhile, demographic pressures are pushing 
real wages down in the absence of more dynamic growth 
in labor-absorbing activities. This leaves policymakers 
with two broad alternatives for generating better income-
earning opportunities for the poor. One approach would 
seek to promote faster growth in the poorer regions and 
low skill-intensive sectors in hopes of catching up to the 
other, faster-growing regions and sectors of the economy. 
An alternative approach is to allow the marketplace to take 
the lead in determining the most dynamic sectors with 
the greatest growth potential, while focusing government 
efforts on providing a growth-friendly macro-environment, 
eliminating barriers and distortions that prevent a faster 
labor absorption into the most dynamic sectors, facilitating 
greater labor mobility across regions and sectors, and 
promoting human capital development. 
63. The key to generating better income-earning 
opportunities is the integration of lagging with leading 
regions and sectors of the economy. The 2009 WDR 
argued that spatial disparities in income and production 
are inevitable, as they are driven by economies of scale 
and agglomeration effects, and that government efforts 
to spread out economic activity equally across the board 
have generally proven to be futile. The same can be 
said about government efforts to “pick winners” among 
different economic sectors. The more promising approach, 
therefore, is to seek the integration of lagging and leading 
regions and sectors of the economy. As outlined in the 
2009 WDR, this approach begins with the application 
of ‘spatially blind’ policies (such as the definition and 
enforcement of property rights and the removal of 
distortions that interfere with the functioning of markets), 
investment in social services, and maintenance of sound 
macroeconomic policies. Where there is limited labor or 
population mobility, the spatially blind policies need to be 
complemented with spatially connective infrastructure 
and social investments, to enable people and workers in 
the lagging regions and sectors to integrate more easily 
with the leading regions. According to this approach, 
spatially or sectorally targeted interventions to promote 
growth should only be considered as a last resort.
64. The effective integration of leading and lagging regions 
or sectors requires investing in both people and places. 
A common question facing policymakers in countries with 
very disparate levels of development across regions and 
sectors is whether to invest the limited public resources 
in places (physical infrastructure) to promote faster 
growth or in people (human capital) to promote faster 
poverty reduction. The answer offered in the 2009 WDR 
is that countries should invest in activities that produce 
the highest economic and social returns nationally. This 
means emphasizing durable infrastructure investments 
that increase national economic growth in the leading 
places with a revealed capacity to grow and emphasizing 
human capital investments in lagging places—that is, 
providing portable investments that stimulate mobility 
and accelerate poverty reduction.37
65. The analysis below addresses the challenge of 
improving income-generating opportunities in the 
Philippines, focusing first on the agricultural sector before 
turning to the non-farm sector in rural areas, which shows 
a great deal more promise for rural poverty reduction. 
This is followed by a closer look at the potential within the 
manufacturing sector, which has contributed significantly 
to GDP growth but generated little employment. Given 
the positive track record of employment generation in 
the services sector, the analysis will not cover the services 
sector separately. However, the role of the services sector, 
particularly in providing employment opportunities for 
unskilled workers, merits further study.
37 Investments in human capital development in effect seek to transform low-
skill labor into the higher-skill labor that was already revealed to be most in 
demand in the leading industrial and services sectors.
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Revisiting growth in agriculture as a pathway out of 
rural poverty
66. The agriculture sector is of special interest from a poverty 
perspective, since the greatest proportion of the poor lives 
in the rural sector and derives income from agriculture. 
Agriculture is generally assumed to be more labor-intensive 
than other sectors and to have important backward and 
forward linkages, so increasing its participation in the overall 
growth process would be expected to enhance the sector’s 
contribution to poverty reduction. It is natural to assume, 
therefore, that the path to prosperity for the poor will require 
rapid agricultural sector growth. These assumptions have 
largely guided Philippine policymakers, resulting in policies 
aimed at sustaining agricultural growth as part of a broader 
agenda to reduce poverty and achieve self-sufficiency in rice, 
corn, and sugar. However, as discussed below, even though 
agricultural growth can make an important contribution to 
poverty reduction, it is unlikely to provide the main impetus 
in this effort.
67. The agriculture sector’s contribution to poverty 
reduction has been much weaker in the Philippines 
than elsewhere in East Asia. One reason for this weak 
contribution is that the performance of Philippine 
agriculture over the last 28 years has been less dynamic 
than in most neighboring economies. The pace of 
agricultural growth has accelerated in recent years, rising 
from an average growth rate of 1.6 percent during 1980-
00 to 3.9 percent in 2000-07, and placing it on a par with 
sector growth rates elsewhere in the region (Table 12).  It 
is unclear how long the Philippines can sustain this pace in 
sector growth, however, given the low productivity growth 
in the sector.
68. Improved productivity is critical for agriculture 
growth in the Philippines. In countries such as the 
Philippines, where the “land frontier” has virtually closed, 
sustained growth of agricultural output can only come 
about through increases in productivity. However, TFP 
growth in agriculture has stagnated in the Philippines at 
0.2 percent per year over the past two decades, compared 
to 1.0 percent per year in Thailand, 1.5 percent per year in 
Indonesia, and 4.7 percent in China (Mundlak, et al, 2004). 
The Philippines has also had the weakest performance 
in the region in terms of growth in real value-added per 
worker, although it has fared slightly better than Vietnam 
during the past decade (Table 12). 
69. These productivity trends reflect a growing scarcity 
of land and a progressive reduction in the amount of 
land per worker, aggravated by agrarian reform policies. 
Agricultural productivity has stagnated over the past 
three decades due to a long-term decline of investment 
in public infrastructure and the gradual decline in farm 
size, due to rapid population growth in rural areas. This 
decline in farm size has been intensified by agrarian 
reforms that have negatively affected the functioning of 
land markets and made access to land more difficult for 
small-scale farmers, aggravating the farm fragmentation 
problem that contributes negatively to TFP growth.
70. Agriculture sector policies have contributed to 
the low productivity growth in agriculture. While 
bringing short-term relief to select groups—though not 
necessarily the groups that would be targeted on poverty 
grounds—current agricultural policy has failed to sustain 
growth in productivity and farm incomes. Instead, the 
country’s strategy to achieve rice self-sufficiency has 
stifled efficient resource allocation and impeded rural 
income diversification. Except for a brief spell during the 
Agriculture Real 
Value Added
Agriculture Real Value 
Added per Worker
Agriculture Value 
Added per Hectare
Agricultural Land per 
Worker
 
1980-
2000
2000-
2007
1980-
2000
2000-
2007
1980-
2000
2000-
2007
1980-
2000
2000-
2007
Indonesia 3.0 3.1 1.1 2.7 1.9 1.9 (0.7) 0.8
Malaysia 2.0 3.7 2.8 4.7 (0.1) 3.2 3.0 1.4
Philippines 1.6 3.9 0.3 2.6 1.0 3.6 (0.6) (1.0)
Thailand 2.8 3.4 2.0 3.0 2.6 4.3 (0.5) (0.9)
Vietnam 3.7 3.9 1.9 2.5 1.5 2.1 (0.3) 0.5
Table 12:  Growth Rates of Key Productivity Indicators in Agriculture, 1980-2007
Source:  World Bank, FAOSTAT. 
P H I L I P P I N E S  F o s t e r i n g  M o r e  I n c l u s i v e  G r o w t h
32
diffusion of the Green Revolution in the 1970s (when 
rice production benefited from significant investments 
in technology development, irrigation and extension, 
along with a favorable trade policy regime and adequate 
conditions in transport and education), production has 
always fallen short of consumption in the Philippines. In 
recent years, the government intensified its intervention 
in the rice sector to prop up local production. Nominal 
assistance rates for rice increased from about 15 percent 
in the second half of the 1980s to about 50 percent in 
the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s (Table 13). 
Despite agricultural tariff declines associated with World 
Trade Organization (WTO) tariff reduction commitments in 
this period, marketing interventions and other non-tariff 
barriers (especially in cereals, sugar, poultry, and livestock) 
have raised the nominal assistance rates in agriculture 
relative to those in other sectors. Nominal assistance rates 
for agriculture rose almost two-fold, from an average of 
only 14 percent in the second half of the 1980s to about 
26 percent in the early 2000s, and peaking at much higher 
rates in the case of certain import-competing agricultural 
commodities (especially rice, corn, and sugar). 
71. The elasticity of poverty reduction to agricultural 
sector growth has been fairly low in the Philippines, and 
decreasing over the past two decades. An analysis of 
FIES income data shows that agriculture’s role in poverty 
reduction is more limited than that of non-agriculture: a 
one percent increase in non-agricultural incomes generates 
a larger impact on poverty reduction than does the same 
increase in agricultural incomes. One explanation for the 
fairly low elasticity between agricultural growth and poverty 
reduction is that the key drivers of total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth for the sector—namely, investment in public 
infrastructure and technological change—reduce the 
sector’s labor-to-capital intensity and thereby reduce its 
employment generation impact.38  
72. Although agricultural growth has long been assumed 
to be the main pathway out of poverty for rural 
households, the nonfarm sector has become just as 
important and is continuing to grow in importance as a 
stepping stone out of poverty.39 A longitudinal study of 
four villages for the period 1985-04 found that households 
with a higher share of non-farm income at the start had 
a higher prevalence of transition out of poverty. At the 
same time, engaging in non-farm activities reduced the 
probability of falling into poverty for rural households 
(Fuwa, 2009). In all four villages studied, employment 
in tertiary sector activities was the dominant source 
of poverty escape. For areas near Manila, the services 
sector was most important, while in other areas, self-
employment and transport played the biggest role. Fuwa 
(2009) also found that international remittances are the 
second most important source of escape from poverty.
73. The relative importance of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors in poverty reduction depends on 
the geography of economic growth. Rural areas that 
are distant from growing urban areas and markets but 
38 An analysis by Teruel and Kuroda (2005) indicates that the elasticities of 
factor share (pertaining to labor, intermediate inputs, and capita) in total cost 
with respect to investment in public infrastructure reveal a labor-saving bias 
in favor of greater capital utilization.  This finding is also consistent with the 
analysis of Mundlak, et al. (2004).  
39 Using a long-term panel study from a village in Pangasinan province, which 
is a highly productive agricultural area, Fuwa and Anderson (2006) and Fuwa 
(1999) document a striking decline in the relative share of households escaping 
poverty via the “agricultural ladder” over the three decades between 1962 
and 1994. These findings suggest that the potential for agriculture’s direct 
contribution to poverty reduction is relatively limited.
 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Agriculture NRAa -3.6 14.4 15.4 33.0 26.0
   All agricultural tradables -4.0 15.8 16.7 35.7 27.9
   All non-agricultural tradables 12.9 11.0 9.9 8.6 7.3
Agriculture RRA (agriculture relative to non-agriculture)b -14.9 4.3 6.1 24.9 19.1
aNRAs including product-specific input subsidies and non-product-specific assistance. Total of assistance to primary factors and intermediate inputs 
divided to total value of primary agriculture production at undistorted prices ( percent).
bThe relative rate of assistance (RRA)  is defined as 100*[(100+NRAagt)/(100+NRAnonagt)-1], where NRAagt and NRAnonagt are the percentage 
NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
Source: David, Intal, and Balisacan in World Bank (2009).
Table 13: Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRA) to Agriculture, 1980-2004
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have high land quality tend to be more dependent on 
agricultural incomes. For these areas, agricultural growth 
will continue to play a significant role, especially if land 
ownership patterns favor a broadly based distribution 
of the benefits of such growth. In contrast, rural areas 
that are well-connected to rapidly industrializing growth 
centers are less likely to depend on agricultural incomes. In 
these cases, non-agricultural employment and enterprise 
development become the main pathway out of poverty. 
(Table 14) summarizes the clustering of the country’s 
79 provinces in terms of geophysical characteristics 
associated with potential for agricultural growth—in 
particular, the potential for irrigation development—and 
access to markets and development opportunities. For 
the 35 provinces characterized by medium to high levels 
of urbanization, non-farm development may be a more 
powerful stimulus for poverty reduction than agricultural 
development, while the opposite may be true for the 44 
highly rural provinces. Of these highly rural provinces, 11 
have low potential for agricultural development due to 
poor quality of agricultural land endowment. For these 
provinces, pathways out of rural poverty also will center 
on the diversification of economic activities away from 
farming and on outmigration.
74. Non-farm employment includes both the rural non-
agricultural sector as well as the urban sector. Aside from 
off-farm employment in rural areas, many of the poor 
are also turning to informal employment in urban areas, 
particularly in the services sector. Even though proximity 
to dynamic urban labor markets made employment in 
factories an important option for job migration in the 
communities sampled by Fuwa (2009), this path was 
dominated by services. Some of the poor who migrate 
from rural areas work in the informal services sector while 
others remain unemployed, either waiting for a job locally 
or abroad, contributing to the higher unemployment 
rates in urban areas. Fostering employment opportunities 
in these other sectors then becomes as important as in 
agriculture and more promising than seeking to generate 
agriculture growth in areas with poor conditions for 
farming. It is for that reason important that the policies 
to generate productive employment remain sector and 
spatially blind. 
75. Even though agriculture has lost its leading role as 
an engine of poverty reduction at the national level, it 
can still play a role in some lagging areas. Agriculture 
retains its importance in lagging areas where it has good 
Notes:  The provincial composition of the regions has changed over the years. For comparability over time, the provinces are grouped consistently 
according to the 2000 regional classification.
Source:  World Bank staff estimates based on data from FIES.
Table 14: Agricultural Resource Endowment and Urbanization
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potential for growth and can contribute to diversification 
of the local economy. To realize its full potential, however, 
it will be critical to push the horizon beyond the farm, for 
example by developing a consolidated agribusiness sector 
in which primary and post-harvest activities are part of 
a continuum. Moreover, agriculture can also play an 
important indirect role in poverty reduction through its 
linkages to other sectors. For example, the food processing 
sector, which comprises about half of the manufacturing 
sector, represents a significant source of employment 
for rural unskilled labor. For the food processing sector 
to thrive, however, TFP growth in agriculture and the 
development of modern institutions with regulatory and 
supervisory functions will be critical. By providing primary 
products at lower cost, agriculture can help support 
the development of the manufacturing sector, thereby 
generating greater domestic value-added and possibly 
more employment.
Strengthening the contribution of manufacturing to 
growth and employment
76. The manufacturing sector has not lived up to its full 
potential as a source of growth and employment in the 
Philippines. Even though manufacturing has been among 
the most important contributors to GDP growth since the 
Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, it continues to be 
less dynamic than in neighboring countries and has only 
been a modest source of employment generation. The 
comparatively weak performance of manufacturing in 
the Philippines is not a recent phenomenon and appears 
to reflect deeper structural weaknesses. The Philippines 
began to industrialize much earlier than its regional 
neighbors,40 but its GDP-share of manufacturing has been 
declining gradually in the Philippines since the mid-1970s, 
while it continued to grow in the other ASEAN countries 
(Figure 18). 
77. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth has accounted 
for only a small part of the growth in manufacturing 
output in the Philippines. Although growth in 
manufacturing value-added is positively associated with 
TFP increases, the relationship has been very weak. This 
finding mirrors the overall pattern of economic growth in 
the Philippines, which had been characterized by negative 
TFP in the 1990s and early 2000s (Table 9).
78. The biggest increases in TFP levels have occurred in 
subsectors with greater competition. Competition is one 
of the most important factors influencing the productivity 
of firms, and one good measure of the degree of 
competition in a sector is the markup of prices over costs. 
The sectors that had lower markups—or faced greater 
competition—in 1999 had greater increases in TFP levels 
during 1999-05. Although it has increased in recent years, 
the overall degree of competition in the manufacturing 
sector remains fairly low. Accordingly, the relationship 
between TFP growth and markups is not very strong.
40 In the early 1960s, manufacturing output accounted for 25 percent of GDP 
in the Philippines but less than 15 percent in the other ASEAN member 
countries.
Share of manufacturing value-added in GDP, 
1960-2006
Evolution of industrial employment, 
1980-2004
Figure 18:  Sector Contribution to GDP and Employment Generation
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators 2008.
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79. TFP and investment in manufacturing are also affected 
by other investment climate factors. The analysis of firm-
level data in the Philippines found that both TFP levels 
and investment are significantly affected by governance-
related factors, infrastructure quality, and labor issues 
(Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank, 2005). 
An investment climate survey completed in 2005 reveals 
that macroeconomic stability and weak governance—
in particular, corruption, regulatory uncertainty, and 
insecurity—are perceived as major business obstacles 
by a large number of firms. Compared to firms in China 
and Indonesia, those in the Philippines are also more 
concerned about infrastructure and labor regulations, 
and they suffer higher losses as a share of sales from 
various unproductive expenses related to these factors.
80. Employment generation is adversely affected by the 
same investment climate factors that undermine TFP. In 
particular, infrastructure problems and labor regulation 
have adverse impacts on employment growth. There is 
also evidence of distortions that constrain labor movement 
and employment growth in the manufacturing sectors. 
One indication of these constraints is that the marginal 
product of labor, or the output produced per additional 
worker, varies widely across manufacturing sub-sectors 
and does not appear to converge over time. If labor 
could move freely, workers would move to sectors where 
marginal labor productivity is relatively higher. However, 
employment growth has not been faster in the sectors with 
higher marginal products of labor (Figure 19). Moreover, 
the differences in the marginal product of labor across 
manufacturing sectors mainly appear to reflect differences 
in the capital-labor ratios across those sectors.
81. High capital-labor ratios also may be indicative of 
policy distortions that adversely affect productivity and 
employment growth. In many manufacturing sub-sectors, 
capital-labor ratios are far higher than what would be 
expected after accounting for differences in technology.41 
This is indicative of the existence of policy distortions that 
affect the relative price of labor and keep employment 
artificially low. The right-hand side of Figure 20 shows 
the level of factor market distortions calculated for each 
manufacturing sector as a proportion of the economy-wide 
41 Assuming that output in each manufacturing sector is determined by a 
production function with constant returns to scale and two homogenous 
factors of production, Capital (K) and Labor (L), profit-maximizing firms in each 
sector will employ labor and capital up to the point where the capital-labor 
ratio multiplied by the inverse of their respective factor shares in each sector 
is equal to the economy-wide wage-rental ratio multiplied by sector specific 
factor distortions; or [Ks/Ls]*[αLs/αKs] = [w/r]*Øs, where Øs refers to the factor 
distortion in sector s.  In the absence of factor market distortions (meaning 
that Øs = 1) and assuming that the wage-rental ratio is the same across 
sectors, the variations in K/L across sectors would only reflect variations in 
the relative factor shares (α
L
/α
K
).  Any variation in K/L across sectors in excess 
of that associated with variations in (α
L
/α
K
) constitutes prima facie evidence 
that Øs is not the same for all sectors.  A high K/L ratio in a particular sector, 
therefore, suggests the presence of large factor market distortions, Øs, that 
raise the relative cost of labor in that sector.  See Chapter III Appendix in the 
Background Papers for further details.
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The marginal products of labor vary widely and have not 
converged over the period 1999-2005
Employment growth has not been faster in sectors with 
a high marginal labor product
Figure 19:  Marginal Products of Labor in Manufacturing
Source:  World Bank calculations based on NSCB, Philippines Statistical Yearbook, various years.
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wage-rental ratio. This calculation reveals large variations 
across sectors, at least part of which can be attributed to 
differences in the magnitude of the sector-specific factor 
price distortions.42  Ranking the sectors according to the 
calculated size of the factor market distortions indicates 
that cement and petroleum products are by far the most 
distorted sectors, followed by rubber, glass, iron and steel, 
and non-ferrous metals. A separate qualitative analysis 
of the cement, petroleum, and glass sectors reveals that 
these sectors have been operating in a very protected 
environment.
82. The elimination of barriers to factor mobility may 
play an important role in accelerating the structural 
transition from agriculture to manufacturing, and 
thereby raise overall economic growth. Barriers to 
financial capital mobility do not appear to constitute 
a critical bottleneck at this time, except for small and 
medium enterprises. Although the amount of domestic 
42 Even in the absence of factor market distortions (i.e., Øs = 1, for all s), we 
may find variations in the wage-rental ratio across sectors if labor is not 
a homogenous factor of production.  That is, if the quality of labor varies 
significantly across sectors (e.g., with some sectors employing a higher 
proportion of skilled versus unskilled labor), the more skill-intensive sectors 
should exhibit a higher average wage-rental ratio.
credit to the private sector as a share of GDP has 
continued to decline gradually since the late 1990s, the 
share of liquid reserves in the total assets of the banking 
system has been rising since 2005, and real interest 
rates have been reasonably low. This suggests that the 
decline in credit is mainly due to limited demand by 
borrowers, rather than supply constraints. On the other 
hand, various elements of the Philippine labor market 
legislation appear extremely rigid by regional and world 
standards, as discussed in the next section. Questions 
remain about the extent to which these elements are 
binding, but policy reforms in this area deserve further 
study and may need to be complemented with additional 
reforms in social safety net legislation to compensate for 
any declines in social protection that could ensue from 
the relaxation of certain labor market restrictions.
83. Another area that deserves particular attention is 
the barriers to competition in Philippine manufacturing 
or modern technology sectors more generally. While the 
level of protection provided through trade policies has 
gone down since the time that Krugman, et al. (1992) 
prepared their report, there are still signs of significant 
market distortions (e.g., the non-convergence of marginal 
labor productivity across manufacturing sub-sectors) 
that contribute, among other things, to the adoption of 
overly capital-intensive production techniques. As judged 
Figure 20:  Capital-Labor Ratios and Factor Market Distortions
… reflecting distortions that make labor more expensive and 
reduce employment in these sectors
Sectors with high average products of labor 
have high capital-labor ratios…
Note:  The horizontal bars on cement and petroleum have been omitted from the figure so as to make the 
differences between the bars of the other sectors visible.
Source:  World Bank calculations based on NSCB, Philippines Statistical Yearbook, various years.
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by the latest Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Tariff Trade 
Restrictiveness Index for overall trade, the Philippines 
remains a relatively open economy and compares well 
to the averages for East Asia and the Pacific and lower-
middle-income countries. However, the Philippines 
continues to exhibit significant domestic constraints 
that protect existing businesses: it ranks 141st out of 181 
countries in the Ease of Doing Business index for 2009, 
reflecting a cumbersome business environment.43 These 
“behind the border constraints” to doing business are 
most effective in protecting businesses engaged in non-
tradables production, since competing tradables are 
produced abroad and not subject to those constraints.44 
The removal of domestic barriers to competition, whether 
through the introduction of a more modern legal 
framework or application of a more effective competition 
policy and strengthened regulatory framework, deserves 
careful consideration. 
43 One domestic barrier to competition that appears particularly onerous 
when coupled with a weak judiciary is the limitation on foreign ownership of 
Philippine assets to a maximum share of 40 percent. This minority ownership 
provision effectively bars many multinationals and banks from entering the 
Philippine market and competing. Another important barrier to competition 
is regulatory capture, which appears to prevail in various regulated activities. 
Though potentially open to all bidders, domestically owned firms tend to be 
more adept at exploiting this option, being more familiar with the domestic 
political environment and legal terrain and less constrained by sanctions on 
corrupt practices introduced by many governments in developed countries in 
the last decade.
44 The shift in relative importance of these barriers to competition, away from 
import barriers toward domestic production barriers, may explain why many 
large domestically-owned companies have recently begun restructuring their 
businesses away from tradable, export-oriented activities into non-tradables; 
see World Bank Philippines Quarterly Update, October 2009, paragraph 16.  
D. Ensuring Adequate Labor Mobility
84. Beyond creating opportunities, it is critical to ensure 
that workers can move to those opportunities. To 
maximize the opportunities that are available, workers 
must have the ability to move to better jobs, more 
productive sectors, and even other geographic areas 
that can offer them better income-earning opportunities. 
Transitions across sectors, for example, are significantly 
correlated with changes in income over time. The 
distribution of changes in incomes due to transitions 
across sectors is particularly favorable for workers moving 
out of agriculture and for those moving into industry. The 
ability to move geographically is also important since it 
is generally not possible to spread economic activity 
equally across space. Especially for workers in lagging 
areas that are near or connected to rapidly industrializing 
growth centers, being able to move and take advantage 
of opportunities in those centers may be their pathway 
out of poverty.
85. Labor flows are responding to sector wage differentials, 
albeit slowly. In a flexible labor market, high dispersion 
in the distribution of wages should lead to transitions 
across sectors, with workers adjusting their skills to take 
advantage of potential income gains. A disaggregation of 
earnings distributions by sector and employment type 
shows a significant degree of variation in average salaries, 
and the panel analysis in Table 15 shows a certain amount 
of labor mobility across sectors during 2003-06: 15.8 
percent of workers who were employed in 2003 and 2006 
changed their sector of employment, while 25.4 percent 
of workers reported a change in employment category. It is 
important to note that transitions into the manufacturing 
sector, which was shown earlier to display signs of factor 
market distortions, are less frequent than transitions into 
other sectors.
2006
Agriculture Industry Services Total
20
03
Agriculture 85.68 4.64 9.68 100
Industry 10.32 70.38 19.30 100
Services 6.22 5.89 87.89 100
Total 35.16 16.00 48.84 100
Note:  figures refer to  percent of workers employed in both periods; panel observations only. 
Source:  Matched LFS-FIES data 2003-2006.
Table 15: Labor Transition Rates between Sectors, 2003-2006
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86. Significant differences in wages across different 
geographic areas suggest a regional segmentation in the 
labor market. Individuals employed in the NCR earn the 
highest wages, while the wage in Visayas is 40 percent 
lower than in the NCR, all other things being equal. 
Rather than declining, wage gaps have actually widened 
over time. Even within regions, wages vary widely across 
sectors. For example, in Luzon, workers in the industry 
sector and services sector earn daily wages that are 46 
percent and 24 percent higher, respectively, than those in 
the agricultural sector. 
87. Another sign of possible labor market segmentation 
is the increase in the unemployment rate of skilled 
labor over 2003-07. This suggests that there is an 
excess supply of skilled labor, especially for younger 
cohorts, which should depress their wages. At the 
same time, however, the skill premium in the wages 
paid to younger workers has increased, as well. This 
points toward the existence of labor market frictions 
that result in the rationing of jobs in growing sectors 
and prevent wages from falling to their market level. 
However, it could also be reflecting an increase in the 
reservation wages of younger, skilled workers. 
88. The mobility of labor may be hindered in part by labor 
market rigidities stemming from employment protection 
legislation. At least on paper, labor market regulations are 
among the most rigid in the region, and minimum wages 
are particularly high. The average level of minimum wages 
in 2007 was set at US$494 (PPP). Higher minimum wages 
have been registered only in two other, more developed 
countries in the region, Taiwan (China), and Korea (Table 
16). The Philippines figure is particularly striking considering 
that only 20 percent of countries worldwide have monthly 
minimum wages exceeding US$500 PPP. The Philippines 
also ranks first regionally in terms of its minimum wage 
as a proportion of GDP per capita (151 percent) or of 
the average wage of salaried workers (91 percent). The 
objective of minimum wage policies is usually to improve 
the welfare of low earners. In a competitive labor market, 
however, minimum wages can contribute to job rationing 
and unemployment if set above the market-clearing 
wage level. Moreover, minimum wages will price out 
workers whose marginal productivity falls below the wage 
floor—typically younger and unskilled workers—inducing 
firms to substitute unskilled labor with relatively more 
productive skilled labor.45 Preliminary evidence regarding 
the employment impact of minimum wages suggests a 
negative relationship.46
89. Compared to other countries in the region, the 
conditions placed on the use of fixed-term contracts are 
among the most restrictive in the Philippines. As shown in 
Table 17, the Philippines, along with Indonesia and Vietnam, 
has the least flexibility in contractual arrangements. 
According to the Philippines Labor Force Survey, 80 percent 
of workers were employed under a permanent contract 
in 2007. Furthermore, the distribution of workers across 
different contract arrangements—permanent, temporary, 
and working for multiple customers or employers—has 
remained fairly stable over the past decade: the share of 
permanent workers has changed by less than 2 percentage 
points in 10 years.
45 One way to mitigate this adverse effect on unskilled workers is through the 
implementation of capacity-building programs.  An example of such a program 
is the Self-Employment Assistance Kaunlaran  (SEA-K), being implemented by 
DSWD in coordination with local government units.
46 The high minimum wages may be preventing a more fluid transition of 
labor from agriculture to other higher-value activities, and contributing to 
the segmentation of the labor market into a formal and an informal sector. 
By raising labor costs in the formal sector, such segmentation would be 
encouraging more capital-intensive production processes in that sector. 
Further analysis is required to ascertain the magnitude of these effects in the 
Philippines.
Table 16: Minimum Wage (MW) Levels in East Asia
                              Level of the minimum wage (2007 or latest)
 PPP (US$) MW/ GDP MW / average 
  per capita (%) wages (%)
Philippines 424 150.6 90.8
Nepal 133 132.4 
Cambodia 156 103.8 
Bangladesh 69 63.6 
Vietnam 120 55.7 58.5
India 113 50.9 22.8
China 204 46.3 37.5
Thailand 304 46.2 56.0
Indonesia 142 45.8 64.0
Korea 815 39.4 28.9
Lao 65 38.0 
Taiwan 955 38.0 36.7
Sri Lanka 122 36.0  
Source: International Labor Organization (ILO 2008).
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E.  Policy Implications
90. To generate better income opportunities in lagging 
regions and sectors of the economy it is best to integrate 
them with the leading ones. In the Philippines, the 
poor mostly reside in rural areas and work in agriculture, 
which has been stagnant for years. Rather than targeting 
productive investments directly to rural areas and the 
agricultural sector, however, the 2009 WDR argues in 
favor of hitching this lagging, rural-based sector to the 
more dynamic urban-based manufacturing and services 
sectors through the application of ‘spatially blind’ policies. 
Such policies primarily involve the elimination of market 
distortions that inhibit sector development and interfere 
with the functioning of markets, coupled with investments 
in spatially connective infrastructure and human capital 
and the maintenance of sound macroeconomic policies. 
91. In agriculture, the application of this approach points 
to a need to review and revise the existing sector policy 
framework, with particular attention to the strategy 
to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of rice 
and other basic commodities, and with respect to the 
agrarian reform. The ongoing agrarian reform policies 
have contributed to a decline in farm size, while the 
policy of self-sufficiency has led to high trade barriers 
that limit competition. Both have lowered productivity 
in agriculture. The stimulation of faster TFP growth will 
also require greater investments in public infrastructure, 
despite its labor-saving bias. Even with such reforms, 
however, agriculture will not become the main pathway 
out of poverty in the Philippines except perhaps in rural 
provinces with strong geo-physical endowments. 
92. In manufacturing, this approach argues for enhancing 
competition, removing key investment constraints, and 
eliminating distortions in factor markets as key priorities 
for improving productivity and employment generation. 
While manufacturing has been one of the most dynamic 
sectors of the economy, it is not living up to its full 
potential in terms of its contribution to overall growth 
and job creation. Despite improved performance over the 
last decade, the manufacturing sector has been exhibiting 
modest growth in comparison with the performance in 
neighboring countries. Three sets of factors have been 
identified that may have contributed to the manufacturing 
sector’s comparatively modest growth performance, 
namely the lack of competition, shortcomings in the 
investment climate, and factor market distortions that 
have tended to promote greater capital-intensity of 
production, resulting in limited labor absorption. 
93. In services, this approach argues in favor of building 
on some of the revealed comparative advantages 
exhibited by the Philippines. Certain leading sectors, 
notably the Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) industry, 
Japan Limited duration (3 years; 5 years for highly specialized employees) several renewals are  
 possible; exemptions exist for  specified projects.
Korea      Limited duration (2 years); exceptions exist for specified projects or tasks.
Malaysia      No limit on duration; contract must be in writing if longer than 1 month.
Thailand      No restrictions; regulations cover every establishment employing at least 20 employees.
Singapore Specified work or specified period of time.
China Overwhelming majority of employment relationships is permanent; contract for defined tasks 
 must be in writing.
Cambodia Limited duration (2 years); defined tasks; contract must be in writing.
Indonesia Limited duration (3 years); no renewals; temporary work.
Philippines Specified projects; limited duration depending on the defined categories; no renewals.
Vietnam Limited duration (1-3 years); 36-month extension; specific/seasonal work
Country              Regulation
Most 
flexible
Moderate
Most 
restrictive
Source: ILO-LABORSTAT, 2008.
Table 17:  Fixed-term Contract Regulations in selected East Asian Countries
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have grown rapidly in recent years, taking advantage 
of the country’s English language skills and improved 
informational connectivity from earlier telecom reforms. 
The main challenge for policymakers is to facilitate further 
growth in these sectors through appropriate investments 
in public infrastructure and expansion of complementary 
education services. In these cases, the private market 
has ‘picked the winners,’ while the public sector would be 
playing a facilitating role. Another sector with apparent 
comparative advantages that have not yet been revealed 
is tourism. It also has the potential to become a major 
source of employment for low-skill labor and contribute 
directly to poverty reduction. To realize that potential, 
however, it will be necessary the address various key 
constraints discussed earlier, including inadequate 
transport and energy infrastructure, which currently 
render the sector uncompetitive vis-à-vis other providers 
in the region.47
   
94. To foster greater competition, the government could 
consider introducing new competition legislation and 
the establishment of an anti-monopoly authority. The 
Philippines had made considerable progress since the 
mid-1980s in opening up the economy to competition by 
removing tariff and non-tariff barriers in the manufacturing 
and other sectors, and by reducing impediments to foreign 
investment. However, the elimination of trade barriers, 
though a powerful instrument, does not automatically 
guarantee a more competitive environment. Sometimes 
foreign competitors that enter the market end up asking 
for protection (as in the cement industry), and in other 
cases, the existing firms are so strongly entrenched that 
they are able to ward off competitors through other 
means (i.e. petroleum industry). Efforts to enhance 
competition therefore call for additional measures, 
including the strengthening of regulatory and consumer 
protection agencies and the facilitation of better access 
to financing for small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs). SMEs are more labor-intensive than larger firms, 
and the growth of this sub-sector could play an important 
role in employment generation, including in rural areas as 
people move out of agriculture.
47 Here, too, the prospects of climate change present important challenges 
for the tourism industry, in particular, considering the rising frequency of 
typhoons and its implications for coastal development.
95. Among the factors that contribute to a good 
investment climate, the firm-based Investment Climate 
Assessment in 2005 put most emphasis on the quality of 
governance and the quality of public infrastructure. In 
particular, the Investment Climate Assessment found that 
both total factor productivity and the propensity to invest 
are particularly sensitive to the prevalence of bribes and 
administrative corruption, as well as to shortcomings 
in the power sector. Improvements in governance, 
including the elimination of corruption, should therefore 
rank high on the agenda of any action plan designed to 
stimulate growth. Efforts to improve the quality of public 
infrastructure, in turn, need to focus on both devoting a 
greater share of the public sector budget to investment 
spending, while leveraging the higher amount of public 
investment spending by continuing to rely on public-
private partnership arrangements. 
96. The factors that limit mobility between jobs and 
between different areas need to be studied further with 
the aim of removing distortions that prevent the labor 
market from functioning more efficiently. On paper, the 
Philippines’ labor market regulations are among the 
most rigid in the region. It is not clear, however, to what 
extent these labor market regulations are binding. There 
is empirical evidence (reported in World Bank, 2005a) 
indicating that labor market regulations are a significant 
determinant of employment growth in the Philippines, 
and a significant number of firms (25 percent) cite labor 
regulations as a severe constraint on their operations. 
However, further analysis is needed to understand 
better the causes of labor market segmentation and 
rigidities and their impacts on mobility and employment 
generation. The recent debate in OECD countries about 
the optimal configuration of flexible labor legislation 
and secure social protection also provides useful insights 
for potential new approaches to tackling the problems 
of the Filipino labor market. The international evidence 
suggests that efficiency gains might be achieved by 
strengthening social protection—i.e. unemployment 
insurance, wage subsidies, safety nets—in a way that is 
inclusive and mobility-friendly. Measures to strengthen 
social protection are discussed in Part III.
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                Assisting Households to 
Part 3     Participate in Markets
97. To take full advantage of the income-earning opportunities available to them, workers must be 
healthy, well-educated, and sufficiently protected from shocks. Evidence from the Philippines and 
elsewhere shows how critical good health is to poverty reduction. For example, decreasing fertility 
can reduce demographic pressures and contribute to improved growth in per capita incomes, while 
better nutrition improves cognitive function and productivity and reduces loss of income from 
morbidity and mortality. Education also plays a critical role: daily wages increase monotonically with 
education level, with university graduates earning P354 a day, while workers with no elementary 
education earning only P106 a day.48 At the same time, having adequate protection from shocks 
helps minimize disruptions to income as well as prevent adverse coping behaviors—including 
reduced spending on education and health—which can lead to greater destitution in the long run. 
Therefore, building human capital through health and education and providing adequate social 
protection are crucial for making growth more inclusive.
98. Although the Philippines has made some progress in all three areas in recent years, major 
challenges remain in ensuring equity and access to quality basic services across the country. Given 
the importance of human capital in enabling households to escape from poverty, the wide dispersion 
in the distribution of human capital in the Philippines could explain why recent economic growth 
has not translated into greater progress in poverty reduction.49 To realize the gains mentioned 
above, health and education services and social protection must themselves be inclusive—that is, 
they must be equally accessible to the poor and rich in all regions of the country, with the same 
level of high quality. Providing such universal access requires sufficient financing and the efficient 
use of resources. Successful implementation also depends on effective management and measures 
to ensure accountability. The following sections explore these issues in health, education, and social 
protection in more detail.
  
A. Improving Health Service Delivery
Key indicators and recent developments
99. Progress in key health indicators has been mixed, both at the national level and across different 
regions. As shown in Table 18, the Philippines has performed relatively well in reducing infant and 
child mortality and is on track to achieving these MDG goals by 2015. However, the Philippines is 
currently not on track to reach the MDG goals for maternal mortality and reproductive health. The 
current estimated maternal mortality rate is 162 deaths per 100,000 live births, which is high given 
the country’s level of development. The latest health surveys reveal that only 66 percent of mothers 
48 See World Bank (2009c).
49 In this context, it is useful to distinguish between an unequal distribution of human capital and a deterioration of the distribution in 
human capital or access to social services.  The former will likely manifest itself in a reduced income elasticity of poverty reduction: 
as income increases, a more unequal distribution of human capital means that the earnings from that capital tend to be less equally 
distributed, with a smaller proportion of increased earnings accruing to the poor.  A deterioration in the distribution of human capital, 
on the other hand, can lead to an increase in poverty independent of any change in aggregate income.  In the sections that follow, this 
report will pay special attention to the distribution of human capital and public expenditures, as well as to changes in both of these 
variables, as possible factors contributing to the increase in poverty observed in the Philippines since 2003.
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receive postnatal care, and only a few obtain complete 
care. As noted in Part I, the Philippines also has a high 
rate of child malnutrition, with the poor carrying most 
of the burden. Among 6-10 year olds, the prevalence of 
underweight children and of stunting was 25.6 percent 
and 35.8 percent, respectively—among the highest rates 
in the region.
100. The lack of progress in addressing high fertility rates 
is particularly worrisome. Using alternative population 
projections, Racelis (2008) found that if intensive family 
planning efforts and changes in fertility preferences were 
to result in replacement fertility being reached by 2020, 
the population would stabilize at around 127 million by 
2050—a 43 percent increase from 88.6 million in 2007. If, 
however, replacement fertility is not reached until 2050, 
the population could grow to 160 million, or almost twice 
as high as in 2007.
101. These population growth scenarios have major 
implications not only for health but also for future public 
expenditure requirements, employment, human capital 
investment, and environmental management. As noted 
earlier, a larger population puts pressure on the economy to 
generate more jobs. It also requires that the government build 
more schools and hire more teachers. Increased public and 
private expenditures for health care are also necessary, and 
as the population ages, the burden of health expenditures 
increases further. For health, the growth scenarios above 
suggest that health expenditure will need to at least double, 
with an even higher burden for the high-growth scenario 
(Racelis, 2008). Population pressures can also increase 
environmental degradation and may push more people into 
areas that are more prone to natural disasters.
  
Table 18:  Progress toward Health, Nutrition, and Population MDGs
MDG
Baseline
1990 or year
closest to 
1990
Level
2002/2003
Current
Level
2008
Target
by
2015
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Prevalence of malnutrition among 0-5 year-old children 
(underweight)
34.5 27.6 26.2. 17.3
Reduce child mortality     
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 children) 80.0 40.1 34.0 26.7
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 57.0 29.0 25.0 19.0
Improve maternal health     
Maternal mortality rate 209.0 172.0 162*  52.2
Increase access to reproductive health services     
Prevalence of men and women/couples practicing responsible 
parenthood
40.0 48.9 50.7 70.0
HIV prevalence < 1 < 1  < 1 < 1 
Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other 
diseases
    
Malaria morbidity rate (per 100,000 population) 123.0 48.0  n.a. 24.0
Provide basic amenities     
Proportion of families with access to safe drinking water 73.7 80.0  86.8
     
* 2006 Family Planning Survey.
   Sources:  National Demographic and Health Surveys (NDHS 1998, 2003, 2008)
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102. However, use of family planning has stagnated in 
the past decade, with persistent unmet needs for family 
planning and inadequate access to family planning 
services for poor women. The percentage of married 
women using family planning has remained static at 
around 50 percent since 1995, although the use of 
modern methods has increased to over 35 percent of 
married women (NDHS 2008). In 2003, only 24 percent of 
women in the poorest quintile were using family planning, 
compared to 58 percent in Vietnam and 49 percent in 
Indonesia. Over half of pregnancies in the Philippines are 
unintended. While poorer women typically want more 
children than wealthier women, women in the poorest 
40 percent of the population have between 1.5-2.1 more 
children than they desire (Guttmacher Institute, 2009). 
Moreover, poor households bear the heaviest financial 
burden for family planning, with the lowest income quintile 
spending 5.6 percent of household health expenditures 
on contraceptives compared to less than one percent for 
the highest income quintile (FIES 2006).
Equity and access
103. The progress in some health indicators 
masks significant differences among the rich 
and poor and among different regions. Health 
outcomes vary significantly by income level and 
geographic location. For example, although infant 
mortality rates have improved at the national 
level, infant mortality was more than twice as 
high among the poorest quintile compared to 
the richest quintile in 2003. Child mortality (ages 
0-5) was more than three times higher among 
the poorest quintile—an increase compared to 
1997 (Table 19). 
104. These disparities in health outcomes are 
unsurprising given the wide disparities in access 
to health services. Variation in immunization 
rates among different income groups and 
geographic areas is particularly revealing. 
Measles immunization coverage in 2003 
exceeded 90 percent among the richest quintile, 
compared to just under 70 percent among the 
poorest quintile. Large geographic disparities can 
be seen in the coverage of DPT3—three doses 
of vaccine against (diptheria, pertussis, and 
tetanus), commonly used as a measure of health 
service availability—with 89 percent coverage in 
the NCR compared to 41 percent in the ARMM. Similar 
disparities are apparent in maternal health: 87 percent 
of birth deliveries in the NCR were attended by a health 
professional compared to only 19 percent in ARMM, 
and 68 percent of deliveries in the NCR were health 
facility deliveries compared to 15 percent in the ARMM 
(NDHS 2008). Figure 21 illustrates the degree of regional 
variation in the percentage of facility deliveries across 
the country. 
Expenditure issues
105. Total health spending in the Philippines has 
increased in recent years, but remains low compared 
to similar countries in the region. Preliminary estimates 
by the World Health Organization (WHO) of the country’s 
National Health Accounts show that for most of the decade 
up to 2005, total health expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP remained relatively unchanged at about 3.4 percent. 
Expenditures then increased in the next two years to reach 
Indicators Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High
Child illlness and mortality
Infant mortality rate 48.8 20.9 42.0 19.5 39.3 13.8 60.6 17.1 109.7 50.3
Under-five mortality rate 79.8 29.2 66.3 20.6 52.9 15.8 76.8 21.9 154.8 63.6
Prevalence of fever (%) 26.4 19.4 28.0 17.8 30.9 18.4 24.6 20.5 33.9 36.3
Prevalence of diarrhea (%) 8.8 4.9 13.1 9.4 18.2 3.8 10.0 8.2 19.5 16.0
Prevalence of acute respiratory 
infection (%) 15.3 9.1 14.6 5.8 23.7 14.0 8.3 5.2 18.3 19.4
Full basic coverage (BCG, 
measles, DPT) 59.8 86.5 55.5 83.0 44.3 92.3 37.1 64.7 28.6 67.7
Measles coverage 67.6 92.2 69.7 89.4 64.4 97.8 59.5 84.9 43.9 81.8
Maternal and reproductive 
Health
Total fertility Rate 6.5 2.1 5.9 2.0 2.2 1.4 3.0 2.2 4.7 2.2
Antenatal visits to medically-
trained personnel 73.1 97.8 72.3 96.6 67.7 99.5 77.6 99.1 21.9 79.6
Delivery by medically trained 
personnel 21.2 91.9 25.1 92.3 58.1 99.7 39.9 93.6 14.7 81.2
Delivery by a doctor 7.1 75.8 8.6 73.2 29.2 91.4 0.7 0.8 0.4 8.8
Delivery in a public facility 7.1 26.3 9.2 31.6 43.2 94.8 3.6 14.7 1.7 36.0
Delivery in a private facility 1.6 52.5 1.2 45.5 4.7 3.9 7.3 66.6 0.1 11.0
Delivery at home 91 21.2 88.7 22.6 51.8 1.1 87.5 17.9 97.1 52.2
Contraceptive prevalence among 
women 19.6 29.4 23.8 35.2 57.9 51.6 48.6 58.1 12.5 25.4
Treatment of childhood illness in 
public facility (% )
Fever 25.6 5.4 38.7 11.6 30.6 19.3 32.0 22.8 10.8 18.1
Acute respiratory infection 37.4 11.9 42.8 14.6 50.5 23.1 39.8 19.6 12.1 22.3
Treatment of childhood illness in 
private facility (% )
Fever 6.5 36.0 6.2 43.8 11.5 43.1 7.1 48.1 18.1 27.3
Acute respiratory infection 9.4 60.8 7.4 60.7 13.1 54.60 8.5 54.2 19.6 29.4
Indonesia
2002/3
Cambodia
2000
Philippines Philippines Vietnam
1998 2003 2002
Table 19:  Equity in Maternal and Child Health Outcomes 
and Services:  Comparing Lowest and Highest Income 
Quintiles in Philippines and East Asia
Note:  “Low” corresponds to the lowest income quintile, while “high” represents 
the highest income quintile.  
Source:  Gwatkin, et al, 2008. 
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an estimated 3.9 percent of GDP in 2007, representing a 
per capita increase from about US$39 in 2005 to US$63 
in 2007. Nonetheless, the Philippines still spends less on 
health as a share of its GDP and less on health per capita 
than other countries in the region with comparable 
income levels. The low overall level of health spending in 
the Philippines is largely due to the low level of central 
government spending on health (Figure 22). 
106.  Although it has increased in recent years, government 
spending on health remains low. After declining in real 
terms for almost a decade, the DOH budget has increased 
from P11.3 billion to P23.7 billion over the past three years. 
General government expenditures on health increased 
from 6.0 percent in 2002 to 6.8 percent in 2007, which 
is comparable to the levels in Cambodia, Indonesia, and 
Vietnam. However, countries such as China and Thailand 
spent more than 10 percent of general government 
expenditures on health. 
107. Local government spending has stagnated in real 
terms over the past decade, which has important equity 
implications since the poor are especially dependent on 
health services provided by local governments. Local 
governments spent a total of P19.9 billion for health, 
nutrition, and population control in 2007. Although this 
represents a modest nominal increase from P16.5 billion 
in 2002, it was a stagnant contribution in real terms. As 
a share of total local government unit (LGU) spending, 
the contribution for health declined from 12 percent in 
2002 to 9.5 percent in 2007. Cities and towns have been 
spending even less, with only 7.5 percent 
and 7.7 percent, respectively, of their total 
2006 expenditures going to health. Notably, 
salary expenditures consume most of local 
government spending, while pharmaceutical 
and medical supplies, capital investments, and 
other operating expenses are systematically 
underfinanced.
108. Access to health services for the poor 
may also be compromised by the high and 
rising share of out-of-pocket (OOP) payments 
for health. Out-of-pocket payments for 
health have been increasing steadily for all 
income categories since 2000, and the share 
of OOP expenditure comprised at least half 
of total health spending over the past decade. 
Preliminary data indicate that this percentage 
has increased despite the reported expansion 
of social health insurance coverage (FIES 2006; 
WHO, 2009), which suggests that health insurance has 
only made a limited contribution to improving access 
to services for the poor. Indeed, social health insurance 
has not reduced the percentage of medical spending as a 
share of total household spending, as it is roughly similar 
at 2.8 percent and 2.7 percent for households with and 
without membership in the Philippines Health Insurance 
Corporation (PhilHealth), respectively (Annual Poverty 
Indicators Survey, (APIS) 2004). 
Accountability issues
109. The poor rely predominantly on the public sector 
for health services, but the quality of care in public 
hospitals has been problematic due in part to lack 
of clear performance benchmarks. The DOH used to 
allocate 60 percent or more of its budget to hospitals, 
but this share decreased to 35 percent in 2008 as budget 
increases were allocated to public health measures 
(Lavado, 2009). Despite the traditionally large share in 
the budget allocation, public hospitals continue to suffer 
from inefficiencies, uneven quality, and inadequate 
funding for medicine and maintenance. To address the 
funding shortfall, public hospitals have formal user fees, 
including revolving drug funds. A major issue is that clear 
performance benchmarks have not been established 
between the Department of Health and the DOH-
managed and LGU-run hospitals, resulting in ambiguity 
over what services the hospitals are accountable for, 
which in turn affects public health service delivery.
Figure 22:  Country Comparison of Government 
Health Spending, 2004
Government Health Spending vs Income, 2004
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health facility (%), by region
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Figure 21:  Birth Deliveries in a Health Facility by Region, 2008
Source:  WB staff, based on data from NDHS 2008
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110. Insufficient monitoring and evaluation of service 
provision have also weakened accountability in public 
health service provision, although the current reform 
agenda attempts to address this problem. The health 
sector reform agenda calls for the use of performance-
based financing to support local service delivery 
and improved performance of public hospitals. The 
government is also strengthening its regulatory capacity 
to ensure that the poor have access to quality medicines 
and other health goods and services.
Policy Implications
111. Given the implications for inclusive growth and health 
outcomes for the poor, a key priority is to strengthen the 
focus on family planning. For the middle and upper classes, 
private sector and social marketing could help encourage 
better family planning practices. For the poor, enhanced 
public service provision will be critical.
112. To address the disparities in access to health 
services, increased public spending for properly targeted 
interventions is needed. In particular, greater investment 
in vaccination coverage, access to health professionals 
and facilities for deliveries, nutritional status of children, 
and water supply and sanitation will be needed for poorer 
areas. On the demand side, conditional cash transfers 
to poor households (Section C below) should improve 
access and utilization of health care services by the poor. 
Financing and appropriate incentives should be provided 
to local governments to increase expenditures on health 
and to upgrade the quality of, and access to, essential 
maternal and child health services. 
113. Access to health services could be improved by 
expanding coverage of the National Health Insurance 
Program. Membership coverage of the program could 
be expanded by reviewing the voluntary component and 
expanding government-subsidized enrollment of the poor 
with improved targeting of the poor by utilization of the 
National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction 
(Section C below). In addition, deeper risk protection, 
another priority area for the national insurance program, 
could be achieved by improving the benefit package—in 
particular, through revising the current inpatient benefit 
and provider payment schemes, and by introducing primary 
care and outpatient drug benefits. 
114. To ensure better quality service provision, greater 
efforts are needed on a number of fronts to improve 
accountability in the health system. First, the services 
provided by public hospitals and LGU-provided services 
could be improved by introducing performance benchmarks, 
holding hospital management accountable through explicit 
contracts, and scaling up performance-based financing. 
Second, access to essential drugs and quality medicines 
could be increased by strengthening regulation, increasing 
procurement transparency, expanding government subsidies, 
and promoting further competition. Finally, the overall 
stewardship of the health sector could be enhanced by 
improving the monitoring and evaluation of the sector and 
the regulation of the private health care sector. 
B. Improving Education and Skills
Key indicators and recent developments
115. Educational attainment has increased dramatically 
over the past two decades, but completion rates for basic 
education remain very low, particularly among the poor. 
The number of workers with primary education has stayed 
roughly constant, while those with secondary and tertiary 
education have doubled. In fact, secondary and tertiary 
enrollment rates in the Philippines are higher than the 
averages in East Asia. However, less than half of children 
in the three lowest expenditure quintiles graduated from 
elementary school, and even in the richest quintile, only 
54.9 percent of children graduated from elementary school. 
At the secondary school level, a 15-17 year old teenager in 
the richest quintile is 4.4 times more likely to have graduated 
from high school than his peer in the poorest quintile.
116. Tertiary and vocational education outcomes are also 
low. Although college and university enrollments have risen 
dramatically since the 1970s, the rate of increase has slowed 
more recently. Enrollment increases since school year 1998-
99 have declined to 1.23 percent per year, a pace that is 
0.67 percentage points slower than the growth rate of the 
15-24 year old population. The quality of tertiary institutions 
is also problematic, as evidenced by uniformly low but 
highly variable passing rates in professional licensure exams. 
Technical and vocational education and training (TVET) has 
also expanded rapidly, with enrollment rising by 9.96 percent 
and the number of graduates rising by 6.85 percent between 
2002 and 2006. However, relative to the size of the TVET 
constituency as estimated by the unemployed labor force, 
the number of individuals served is not yet very significant.
P H I L I P P I N E S  F o s t e r i n g  M o r e  I n c l u s i v e  G r o w t h
49
117. Emerging skills gaps in the service and manufacturing 
sectors point to problems with the quality and relevance 
of education. The problem of a skills mismatch is 
particularly evident in growth sectors that require more 
skilled workers. This skills mismatch is exacerbated by 
migration, with about one-quarter of the labor force 
being employed abroad, as well as falling labor force 
participation rates among the most educated workers. 
In the services sector, vacancy analysis shows difficulties 
in filling skilled vacancies, particularly for managers, 
professionals, and sales workers. These difficulties appear 
to stem from the quality of graduates, relevance of higher 
education skills, and low levels of certification in fields 
relevant to growing subsectors. In the manufacturing 
sector, evidence points to problems of staff turnover for 
managers and professionals and the insufficient quality 
and relevance of post-secondary TVET. The main issues 
include poor perceptions of TVET graduates among 
manufacturing employers and a lack of certified TVET 
graduates in some technologically advanced fields. 
Equity and access
118. Gaps in access to basic education persist between 
poor and non-poor households, contributing to greater 
inequality. Data from the 2004 APIS shows that the 
proportion of children 16 years or younger who were in 
school increased—at a decreasing rate—by expenditure 
quintile, from 85.0 percent in the poorest quintile to 
98.1 percent in the richest. As shown in Figure 23, the 
largest adjacent quintile difference was between the 
lowest two quintiles, indicating that the drop-off in 
schooling opportunities was most severe for children in 
the poorest quintile. 
119. Higher education and TVET, which are important 
for economic growth, also appear to be less accessible 
to the poor. Data merged from the LFS and FIES in 2006 
show that the attendance rate in tertiary institutions 
was only 24 percent among the poorest income decile, 
compared to 46 percent in the richest decile. College 
education has remained out of reach for the poor due to 
the high indirect costs of schooling and credit constraints. 
The coverage of financial assistance programs for 
students from low-income families such as the Private 
Education Student Financial Assistance (PESFA) program 
and the Study Now Pay Later Plan (SNPLP) is quite limited. 
While the accessibility of TVET programs for the poor is 
difficult to determine given the heterogeneity of the 
target clientele, an analysis of regional poverty incidence 
and regional share in total enrollment in TVET programs 
shows a negative correlation. In other words, regions that 
need them more are allocated a smaller share of TVET 
resources (Figure 24).
Figure 24:  Poverty Incidence and Share in Total Enrollment in TVET Programs, by Region, 2006
Source:  Lanzona (2008), based on data from TESDA and 2006 FIES.
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Figure 23:  Percentage of Children in School, 2004
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Table 20:  National Government Expenditures on 
Education as a Percent of GNP, 1985-2003
 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003
Philippines 1.35 2.90 3.15 3.28 2.77
Indonesia n.a. 1.04 n.a. 1.01 1.28
Malaysia 6.61 5.45 5.00 6.38 7.91
Singapore 4.40 3.01 2.98 3.98 4.23
Thailand 3.79 3.59 3.59 4.55 4.13
Source:  Manasan and Cuenca (2007).
120. Disparities in education access are also evident 
across geographic regions. Figure 25 reveals significant 
geographic disparities, with children in the Mindanao 
regions of Zamboanga, Davao, SOCCSKSARGEN, and 
ARMM having relatively less access to schooling. In the 
ARMM, only 78 percent of children 16 years or younger 
attended school, compared to the national average of 
90.2 percent and to 94.3 percent in the NCR.
Expenditure issues
121. Overall, total government education expenditures 
as a proportion of GDP have fallen in recent years. Total 
government expenditures on education declined from 
3.4 percent of GDP in 2002 to 2.4 percent in 2008. The 
Philippines’ level of public spending has been relatively 
low compared to its Asian neighbors, with the exception 
of Indonesia (Table 20). Although the budget share of 
public spending on basic education has risen, the real 
amount spent on basic education and per pupil real 
spending were lower in 2008 than in 2002. 
Figure 25:  Percentage of Children in School by Region, 2004
Note:  Children are defined as 16 years of age or under.
Source:  APIS 2004.
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122. Large regional variations in national government 
per pupil spending have persisted, while local 
government spending comprises a small proportion 
of basic education expenditures. Even at the peak of 
national government spending on basic education in 
2007, estimates of this spending ranged from P5,517 
and P5,405 in Central Visayas and NCR, respectively, to 
P7,403, P7,495, and P8,511 in Cagayan Valley, Ilocos, and 
CAR, respectively (Figure 26). In the NCR, LGU spending 
in education usually compensates for the national 
government shortfall, as indicated by the data for 2006. 
Other regions are not as fortunate, since their LGUs are 
unable to generate revenues as large as those of the NCR. 
Local governments fund a very small proportion of basic 
education expenditures—between 7-8 percent over the 
years, with a peak of 8.4 percent in 2006.
123. Persistent inefficiencies in resource management 
and utilization make it difficult for the Department of 
Education to deliver quality education services efficiently. 
The DepED has increased its budget allocation for 
recurrent expenditures over the past two years, enabling 
it to implement interventions for improved teaching 
and learning. Nonetheless, resource management and 
utilization continue to be inefficient. A World Bank Budget 
Execution Study of large items in the 2007 DepED budget 
found that slow execution of some priority programs 
hampers the Department’s ability to deliver quality 
education services efficiently. Figure 27 shows an erratic 
pattern of budget execution in four priority program/ 
activity/ project (PAP) items. Analyses conducted to 
date indicate that much of this erratic pattern is due to 
institutional and managerial weaknesses.
Accountability issues
124. In the past, weak governance greatly hampered the 
performance of the basic education sector in the Philippines. 
There was limited provision for disadvantaged communities, 
little empowerment of local school communities, and 
favorable treatment of selected communities that received 
strong political support. With the slow implementation of 
decentralization, decision-making on education remained 
largely regulated by central prescriptions, and no clear 
accountability structure was in place. Moreover, resource 
management was inefficient, and schools were unable to 
respond flexibly to local needs.
Figure 27: Utilization Rate for Selected Department 
of Education Programs,  2005-2007
Source: DepEd Budget Division.
Figure 26:  National Government (NG) Expenditures per Student and 
Local Government (LG) Expenditures per Student, by Region
Source:  DepEd.
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125. Recognizing these shortcomings, successive DepEd 
administrations have progressively refined a set of reform 
strategies that have culminated in the school-based 
management initiative. By 2005, there was widespread 
consensus on the nature of reforms that would empower 
local communities to improve schools and monitor results. 
Efforts were initiated to decentralize the administration 
of education to the grassroots level through school-based 
management (SBM), which was piloted and implemented 
in public elementary and secondary schools in 2000 and 
is now being rolled out on a phased basis nationwide 
through the government’s Basic Education Sector Reform 
Agenda. The SBM model has forged partnerships between 
schools and communities to improve learning outcomes 
and school performance, mobilize resources for reforms, 
and foster a culture of ownership and responsibility among 
local stakeholders, thus enhancing accountability.
126. A crucial component for fostering accountability in 
SBM is the system of checks and balances. In the SBM 
system, decisions for a School Improvement Plan are made 
collaboratively among all stakeholders then affirmed by 
the school and community in a public assembly. At the end 
of the school year, a School Report Card, which assesses 
plan implementation and the performance of the school 
and students, is made at a public assembly, after which a 
review of the School Improvement Plan is made as a basis 
for the next year’s plan. The SBM system also includes the 
preparation of a School Operating Budget, and the inflows 
and outflows of Funds are reported at the same public 
assembly where the School Report Card is presented.
127. Involving local stakeholders in addressing local 
problems in basic education appears to have had 
positive results. SBM has empowered communities by 
giving local stakeholders the opportunity to participate in 
setting priorities for school improvement and to monitor 
outcomes. As a result, education has become more 
responsive to the needs of the poor and disadvantaged, 
such as indigenous peoples. Using an administrative 
dataset of SMB pilot schools in the 23 poorest public 
school divisions in the country, an initial World Bank 
assessment of the effects of SBM on student performance 
found that SBM has had a statistically significant, albeit 
small, overall positive impact on average school-level 
test scores. It has also had positive spillover effects—for 
example, the collective responsibility developed among 
local stakeholders has extended to providing for health, 
nutrition, and early childhood development needs.
Policy implications
128. Expanding demand-side interventions and scholarship 
programs could help increase educational enrollments, 
particularly among the poor. Conditional cash transfer 
programs, which provide transfers to families that fulfill 
certain criteria such as school enrollment for children, can 
be an effective demand-side intervention to help improve 
the human capital of the poor and thereby lower inequality. 
An effective targeting system is critical to the success of such 
programs. To help reduce the financial burden of schooling 
for poor households, effective scholarship programs and 
student loan programs—especially for the poorest income 
quintile—should also be expanded.
129. The level and efficiency of education expenditures 
need to be raised to enable the provision of quality 
education services around the country. Greater real 
per capita spending in basic education is needed to help 
reduce inequality between the poor and non-poor. At 
the same time, the limited public funding for tertiary 
education should be used more strategically. In general, 
new public investments should be better targeted to 
benefit the poorest. Special attention is needed to 
ensure that adequate resources reach schools in a timely 
manner—the continued decentralization of resources to 
schools, for example for school maintenance and other 
operating expenses (MOOE), would help in this regard. An 
equity- and poverty-based formula for MOOE allocation 
should be applied immediately.
130. Further involvement of local communities and 
the private sector would also help improve education 
service delivery. Given the achievements of SBM to date, 
it should be implemented as quickly as possible, which 
would require changes in attitudes and actions at all 
levels, including the need to move away from regulation 
by central prescriptions. Where available, private sector 
capacity should also be utilized in cases where it has 
been shown to be more effective, but under an improved 
quality assurance framework.
131. To help address the problem of skills gaps, which 
is critical for raising economic growth, higher education 
and TVET need to be more responsive to the needs of 
the labor market. As a starting point, the quantity and 
quality of information on the labor market needs to be 
improved, with better and more complete firm and labor 
force surveys. Close linkages between post-secondary and 
tertiary education and industries, for example through 
P H I L I P P I N E S  F o s t e r i n g  M o r e  I n c l u s i v e  G r o w t h
53
greater collaboration in curriculum design, training, 
and research and development, would also help make 
education more responsive to the demands of employers. 
In addition, the skills supply system needs to be better 
articulated through strengthened skills certification and 
through an education and training quality assurance and 
accreditation system.
C. Strengthening Social Protection
Key indicators and recent developments
132. Social protection has been viewed as a way to 
promote equity and growth by assisting the poor to 
manage risk and safeguard their human capital. In the 
face of health, labor, price, and other idiosyncratic and 
macroeconomic shocks, poor households are bound 
to adopt coping strategies that can impair households’ 
human capital or hinder further investment, leading them 
to a vicious cycle of increased destitution. For instance, 
falling income among poor households leads to increased 
child malnutrition with long-lasting consequences on 
child growth, cognitive and learning ability, and schooling 
attainments (Alderman et al, 2006; Ferreira and Schady, 
2008); higher dropout rates with long-term consequences 
for the children’s labor market performance (Ferreira and 
Schady, 2008); and selling productive assets (livestock and 
land) which impedes households’ recovery from the shock 
(Fafchamps et al., 1998; Carter et al., 2004). 
133. The lack of progress in poverty reduction and 
the human and social impacts of the recent food, fuel, 
and financial crises, as well as the typhoon disasters 
that followed, have underscored the need for social 
protection to assist the poor and vulnerable. As in other 
countries in East Asia and the Pacific, the negative effects 
of the 1997-98 financial crisis drew greater attention 
to the problem of vulnerability and the need to protect 
poorer households from shocks. Since then, rising 
poverty incidence, the adverse impacts of the food and 
fuel price shock in 2008, the socioeconomic effects of the 
global economic crisis, and the disaster triggered by two 
typhoons in September and October 2009 have raised 
concerns over the effectiveness and efficiency of social 
protection services. 
134. The importance of social protection is underscored 
by the large proportion of the population living near the 
poverty line. As discussed in Part I, raising the poverty 
threshold to an international poverty line of US$2 per day 
reveals that an additional 19.4 percent of the population in 
2006 would be classified as poor. The National Anti-Poverty 
Commission (NAPC) and the NSCB estimated that around 
45 percent of Filipinos face the risk of falling into poverty. 
Shocks that commonly push vulnerable households into 
poverty in the Philippines are those related to health, 
employment, natural disasters, civil unrest, and food prices. 
(World Bank, 2001b)
135. Although the Philippines has numerous social 
protection programs in place, their effectiveness has been 
compromised by targeting, financing, and management 
problems. The largest share of social protection resources 
is dedicated to programs aimed at addressing price and 
income shocks, such as price subsidies, food transfers, and 
cash transfers, including those that support livelihood and 
other community-based programs. Other major programs 
focus on protecting households from health shocks, natural 
disasters, and labor market shocks. Although the attention 
to social protection is commendable, the lack of a legitimate 
and functional system for targeting has undermined the 
effectiveness of programs in helping the poorest and 
most vulnerable households. These efforts have also been 
compromised by the limited resources for social protection 
and by weak policy and institutional coordination. 
Targeting issues
136. The development impact of the most significant 
social protection programs is severely limited by low 
coverage of the poor and high leakage to non-poor. 
International experience shows that directing resources 
toward the poor or vulnerable can increase the benefits 
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that can be achieved within a given budget or can 
achieve a given impact at the lowest cost (Grosh et al, 
2008). However, a number of social protection programs, 
particularly those that comprise the largest portion of 
government spending, are characterized by exceptionally 
high leakage rates—that is, a large proportion of those 
reached by the programs are classified as non-poor. As 
shown in Table 21, leakage rates for the major social 
protection programs range from 40 to 72 percent.
    
137. The rice subsidy, which consumes the largest share 
of government spending on social protection, is poorly 
targeted and undercovers the poor. The National Food 
Authority (NFA) rice intervention is a universal consumer 
price subsidy which by design also benefits the non-poor. 
World Bank estimates using FIES 2006 data show that 
the poorest income decile consumes only 14 percent of 
the total NFA rice subsidy. In addition, the geographic 
distribution of NFA rice is not sensitive to poverty 
incidence. For instance, the shares of NFA rice in total rice 
consumption in Western Visayas (5.9 percent), ARMM 
(7.1 percent), and Cagayan Valley (9.9 percent) in 2006 
were low, although the poverty incidence in these regions 
was high. While various attempts have been made to 
improve the targeting for poor households, the leakage 
rate remains very high.   
138. The proxy means test targeting methodology 
underpinning the National Household Targeting System 
for Poverty Reduction (NTHSPR) used for the 4Ps CCT 
program appears to have resulted in higher coverage 
of the poor and potentially higher poverty impact. 
The Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) is a 
CCT program providing health and education grants to 
qualified households on the condition that the children 
be sent to schools and health centers for regular check-
ups and vaccinations. As described in Box 1, the program 
uses a proxy means test (PMT) targeting mechanism 
that appears to have performed well in pilot areas. It is 
estimated that 87 percent of households classified as 
poor were identified as potential program beneficiaries. 
The 4Ps is expected to increase the total incomes of poor 
and eligible households by an average of 23 percent 
and to reduce poverty incidence in targeted areas by 
6.1 percentage points.50 Although these estimates are 
preliminary, they are consistent with the results of impact 
evaluations of comparable CCT programs in countries 
such as Mexico and Colombia. 
139. To improve the targeting of its social protection 
programs, the government is putting in place a 
national household targeting system that uses the PMT 
methodology. As part of its social protection reform 
agenda, the government is implementing the National 
Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS-
PR), which uses the PMT methodology in selecting the 
poor. The NHTS-PR is intended to be used for targeting 
the beneficiaries of key social protection programs of 
DSWD as well as other government agencies. 
50 World Bank staff simulations based on the total cash transfer (health plus 
education component), computed according to the actual demographic 
composition of potential beneficiary households and per capita income 
predicted using the PMT.
Table 21:  Estimated Leakage Rates of Selected Social Protection Programs
Selected Programs Intended Beneficiaries Leakage Rate
• Pantawid Kuryente Program
Households with electricity consumption of no more than 100kwh 
(lifeline power consumption level) in May 2008 
72
• Food-for-School Program 
Poor households in selected geographic areas with public school 
children enrolled in accredited day-care centers, pre-school, and Grade I
59-62
• Tulong Para Kay Lolo at 
LolaProgram 
Persons 70 years old or older with no income or retirement benefits 61
• PhilHealth Indigent Program Indigent households 40-50*
• NFA rice price subsidy Poor households nationwide 41*
Sources: Manasan (2009); * World Bank staff estimates.
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Box 1: National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction
The National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS-PR) uses a Proxy Means Test (PMT) approach to select 
poor beneficiaries for program access. It is used by the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps), a conditional cash transfer 
(CCT) program. During the pre-pilot and initial phase of the roll-out to 360,000 households in 2008, targeting included two 
steps: (i) selection of poor provinces based on poverty incidence according to the Family Income and Expenditure Survey 
(FIES) in 2006 and selection of municipalities based on poverty incidence according to Small Area Estimates in 2003 and 
(ii) assessment of households through the application of PMT, in which household incomes are predicted on the basis of 
demographic, educational, and socio-economic characteristics. The information for estimating the PMT is gathered in a two-
page questionnaire with relevant variables that predict household income. The PMT model was estimated using the FIES and 
Labor Force Survey. 
The information for calculating the PMT is collected using a number of data-collecting strategies such as survey sweeping (i.e. 
all residents in a given area are surveyed), on-demand application, or a combination of the two methods depending on the 
poverty incidence and the urban/rural classification of the areas to be surveyed. The information is processed in a standardized 
way using software developed for that purpose and is routinely validated. A PMT model is then calculated to classify households 
as poor or non-poor based on the provincial poverty thresholds established by the National Statistical Coordination Board for 
2006. This targeting method has been used in other middle-income countries such as Mexico, Colombia, Chile, and Costa Rica, 
where reported income is hard to verify as a large number of people work in the informal sector and there are few databases 
available to cross-check incomes or assets.            
Source: World Bank (2009).
Expenditure issues
140. Government spending on social protection has 
increased in response to the food and fuel price crises. 
When the sharp spike in global rice prices combined with 
increases in fuel prices hit the Philippines in mid-2008, the 
government increased its spending on social protection to 
nearly three times the spending in 2007. The total amount 
of spending on social protection rose from P28.2 billion in 
2007 to P80.4 billion in 2008 (including off-budget spending 
by NFA), where the latter accounted for 6.6 percent of the 
national budget and 1.1 percent of GDP (Table 22).  
141. Government spending on social protection during 
non-crisis times is relatively low, however. The “correct” 
amount of spending on social protection is debatable and 
depends on numerous factors such as poverty levels, the 
need for social protection programs, and the ability of the 
government to meet those needs given overall resource 
constraints. Nevertheless, social protection spending 
in the Philippines for a relatively stable year—meaning 
a non-crisis year such as 2007— has been quite low at 
0.4 percent of GDP, especially compared to spending 
in neighboring countries at similar levels of economic 
development (Figure 28). A cross-country analysis of 
patterns of government social protection spending from 
1972 to 1997 shows that, as a percentage of GDP, Malaysia 
2007 2008
Total Social Protection 
(P, millions)
28,214 80,418
 Percent of national budget 2.4 6.6
 Percent of GDP 0.4 1.1
Source:  Manasan (2009).
Table 22:  Government Spending on 
Social Protection Programs, 2007-2008
Figure 28:  Government Spending on Social Protection, 2007
Sources:  Besley, et al. (2003) and Manasan (2009).
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Programs by Shock 
2007 2008
Pesos 
(millions)
 Share to
total (%)
Pesos 
(millions)
 Share to
total (%) 
Price and Income Shocks 23,659 83.9 74,832 93.1
NFA rice price subsidy 16,200 57.4 60,880 75.7
Food transfers 4,098 14.5 4,347 5.4
Cash transfers 50 0.2 6,197 7.7
Livelihood programs 251 0.9 160 0.2
Community-based programs 1,962 7.0 2,348 2.9
Programs for special needs 1,098 3.9 900 1.1
Natural Disasters 1,265 4.5 986 1.2
Disaster relief 263 0.9 326 0.4
Disaster rehabilitation 1,002 3.6 660 0.8
Health Shocks 2,100 7.4 2,200 2.7
Health insurance for indigents 2,100 7.4 2,200 2.7
Labor Market Shocks 1,188 4.2 2,401 3.0
Skills enhancement programs 510 1.8 1,350 1.7
Labor and employment assistance programs 678 2.4 1,051 1.3
Total 28,214 100.0 80,418 100.0
Source:  Manasan (2009).
Table 23:  Estimated Government Spending on Social Protection Programs, 2007 and 2008
spends 1.2 percent, Indonesia 0.9 percent, Thailand 0.6 
percent, and Singapore 0.5 percent (Besley et al, 2003). 
Another study covering 87 developing and transition 
countries during 1996-2006 shows that mean spending 
on safety nets is 1.9 percent of GDP (Weigand and 
Grosh, 2008).
 
142. The allocation of funding across social protection 
programs is uneven. The social protection system in the 
Philippines has relied heavily on in-kind or food transfers, 
with rice and food subsidies accounting for 70-80 percent 
of social spending in 2007 and 2008 (Table 23). Even 
though they involve higher implementation costs, food 
transfers continue to be the main social protection 
instrument. At the same time, resources for programs 
protecting the poor from shocks related to health, 
employment, and natural disasters have been limited, 
oftentimes leaving the poor to rely on their own devices 
when such shocks occur. However, the recent shift 
toward CCT programs, which provide social assistance 
and encourage formation of human capital as a means 
of breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty, is a 
promising development.
143. Lack of policy coordination in social protection also 
reduces the efficiency of sector spending. The existing 
social protection system has a range of subsidy and transfer 
programs that are administered across multiple agencies 
and in an ad hoc manner. This fragmentation of programs 
reduces the overall efficiency of spending on social 
protection. It also inhibits the adoption of a systematic 
strategy for addressing the risks and vulnerabilities of 
the population and makes it difficult to develop a more 
coherent social protection response to crises. 
Accountability issues
144. Limited institutional capacity and other factors 
pose a constraint to improving accountability in social 
protection programs. Clear governance structures, 
robust control, and accountability mechanisms are 
necessary for the effective and efficient delivery of social 
protection programs. International best practice shows 
that to minimize losses in administering social protection 
programs, adequate systems to prevent, detect, and deter 
error, fraud, and corruption must be in place. However, in 
the Philippines as in other developing countries, limited 
capacity and resources, the lack of accurate computerized 
systems for auditing, and the large share of the informal 
economy make it difficult to improve accountability.
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145. The 4Ps CCT program is paving the way for a 
modernized social protection system that integrates 
control and accountability measures. The design of 
the 4Ps draws heavily on international experience 
that establishes solid structures for ensuring adequate 
transparency, accountability, and governance in 
program implementation. For example, an objective and 
transparent methodology is used to select the geographic 
areas where the 4Ps will be implemented as well as to 
select beneficiaries, and the PMT results are subject to 
community-level verification. The 4Ps has also established 
a simple and accessible grievance and redress system for 
program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Moreover, 
the payment system for 4Ps does not require the services of 
intermediaries, as cash transfers are paid directly into the 
designated accounts of beneficiaries through electronic 
banking. Routine monitoring by the project management 
office and government and by an independent committee 
helps ensure strong project oversight. 
Policy implications
146. Better targeting is critical for ensuring that social 
protection programs benefit the poor and vulnerable. 
Programs should be targeted wherever and whenever 
possible so that more generous benefits can be provided 
to the poor and vulnerable who really need the assistance. 
A standardized and transparent household targeting 
system can also improve the governance, transparency, 
and credibility of programs. The PMT methodology is one 
of the most advanced systems for targeting, and once in 
place, the NHTS-PR should be used to target various social 
protection programs. Other targeting methods may also 
be used, as PMT tends to be unresponsive in the short 
term to changes in the need for assistance (see Ravallion, 
2003 and 2008). Other targeting methods include simpler 
categorical targeting (e.g., elderly, disabled), geographical 
targeting (universal coverage in areas with high poverty 
incidence), and self-targeting, where limited assistance 
is offered to everybody but at some costs to households, 
such that only the neediest ones would participate. 
147. The delivery of social protection services could also 
be enhanced through improved coordination in social 
protection policy. A key step in this direction was the 
passing of an operational definition of social protection in 
2007 to help establish a common framework for designing 
and implementing a national social protection strategy. 
Another important development was the creation of the 
inter-agency National Social Welfare Program in 2008. This 
inter-agency body has undertaken an assessment of the 
existing social protection programs, with a view to scaling 
up and reallocating resources to the most effective and 
efficient ones.  In 2009, the government adopted a Social 
Protection Framework that provides an inventory and 
typology of major programs.  Further analysis leading to 
an overall operational social protection strategy will be 
critical for taking these efforts forward.  An important 
positive step taken in this direction is the establishment 
of the Social Protection Sub-Committee under the 
Social Development Committee of NEDA, chaired by 
DSWD.  Among others, the sub-committee is responsible 
for coming up with a social protection strategy that is 
consistent with national development priorities and 
ensuring that institutional arrangements are in place to 
implement the strategy. 
148. The 4Ps could serve as the potential backbone of a 
modern and more consolidated social protection system 
for the Philippines. As noted above, the design of the 4Ps 
and its PMT targeting system are based on best practice 
examples from other countries which have proven to have 
good targeting outcomes. Such CCT programs have also 
been found to be effective demand-side interventions 
for building human capital. The 4Ps is therefore a 
promising backbone for the social protection system 
and, if successful, could potentially replace other subsidy 
and transfer programs as a flagship social protection and 
poverty reduction program for the country. In particular, 
the government could explore the use of more cost 
effective and better targeted cash transfers to assist the 
poor in place of current commodity subsidy programs 
that have been shown to have high administrative and 
delivery costs in addition to being poorly targeted.
149. Finally, to help ensure successful implementation, 
it will be important to enhance the capacity of 
government agencies involved in social protection. 
The implementation capacity of key agencies is a key 
consideration in designing social protection programs. 
For example, the 4Ps requires significant administrative 
capacity in the DSWD. To roll out the program successfully, 
extensive training will be needed on all the operational 
steps of the program, including on how to operate 
effective monitoring and evaluation systems, for staff at 
the central and local levels. Enhancing the capacity of 
DSWD to implement the 4Ps, as well as the NHTSPR, could 
lead to the emergence of a strong institutional leader in 
the social protection sector.
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Technical Annex I
The Impact of Sector Structure and Productivity 
Growth on Overall Growth
Table A1 describes the actual evolution of labor productivity and labor shares from the late 1980s to the early 
2000s. It shows that labor productivity increased very little over this period (and was most pronounced in 
agriculture), and that the decline in the labor share engaged in agriculture was entirely absorbed by the services 
sector. The first row in the lower half of Table A1 shows the change in average output per worker, calculated as 
a weighted average over all sectors, which has resulted from the actual evolution of labor productivity and labor 
shares in the Philippines. It indicates an absolute change of 10.5 percent, which works out to a growth rate of 
under 0.7 percent per annum over this period. 
The second row in the lower half of Table A1 (Scenario B) shows the change in overall output per worker that 
would have occurred if the entire decline in the labor share of agriculture had been absorbed into the more 
productive industry sector instead of the Services sector, while labor productivity in each sector continued to 
evolve as in the Actual case. The third row (Scenario C) shows the change in overall output per worker if labor 
productivity in each sector had increased across both periods at the average rate observed in Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand, while sector labor shares evolved as in the Actual case. (The basic parameter assumptions for 
Scenarios A and B are presented in the last two columns of Table A1.)  Finally, the last row of the table presents 
the joint impact of the two alternative scenarios. 
The main finding from this decomposition is that output per worker in the Philippines could have grown by 
almost 3 percent per annum between 1987 and 2004, instead of just 0.7 percent, if it had succeeded in achieving 
a faster transformation from agriculture to industry and if labor productivity in each sector had grown as fast as 
in the other middle-income East Asian economies. These two factors would have brought the overall economic 
growth rate in the Philippines close to the average growth rate experienced in these other economies.
  Actual  Scenario B Scenario C
 Labor Productivity Labor Shares Labor shares Labor Product.
 constant 1985 P (‘000) percentages percentages 1985 P (‘000)
period ave.  1987-90 2002-04 1987-90 2002-04 2002-04
Agriculture 14 17 47 37  37 21
Services 31 31 38 48 38 38
Industry 66 67 15 15  25 80
 Average Output/worker
 1987-90 2002-04 Change % % per annum 
Actual 28.26 31.22 2.96 10.47 0.67 
Scenario B 28.26 34.82 6.56 23.21 1.40 
Scenario C 28.26 38.01 9.75 34.50 2.00 
Scenario B+C 28.26 42.21 13.95 49.36  2.71 
Source: World Bank calculations based on World Bank Development Indicators. Notes:  Scenario B assumes that labor productivity evolves as in the 
Actual case, but that the reduction in agriculture’s employment share is entirely absorbed into the industry sector. Scenario C assumes that sector 
employment shares evolve as in the Actual case, but that labor productivity increases in each sector by the average increase observed in Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand across both periods.
Table A1: The Growth Impact of Structural Transformation and Sector Productivity Change
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Technical Annex II
The Link between the Regional Composition of 
Growth and the Evolution of Poverty
Consider a country with two regions; one rich and the other poor. The poverty headcount ratio in 
each region is denoted Hi for i = R (rich) or P (poor), and GDP (or Income) per capita is denoted Gi 
for i = R, P. The total GDP (G) and poverty headcount ratio (H) of that country can then be calculated 
as weighted averages of the regional per capita GDPs and poverty ratios:
            H =  αRHR + αPHP, and
            G =  αRGR + αPGP, 
where αR and αP represent the shares of total population in regions R and P, such that αR + αP = 1.
Assume that the poverty headcount ratio in each region is negatively related to per capita GDP 
in that region, with decreasing marginal impact. That is, for Hi(Gi) > 0, Hi ’< 0 and Hi’’ > 0, for i  = R 
and P. These second order assumptions simply say that the impact of an increase in per capita GDP 
on poverty reduction tends to diminish as the region becomes richer. With this simple model, the 
evolution of a country’s GDP and overall poverty headcount ratio are determined by the evolution 
of the regional per capita GDP levels, as follows:
             dH =  αRHR’ dGR  +   αPHP’dGP 
             dG =  αR  dGR  + αP dGP  
or, expressed in vector notation: (dH, dG)’ = [A] (dGR , dGP)’. The matrix A in this expression is signed 
−−++, and its determinant is given by Δ = αR*αP (HR’ -  HP’) > 0, since HR’ > HP’ as long as GR  > GP. 
By inverting the previous expression, it is possible to determine what the regional growth patterns 
would have to look like in order for both the overall poverty headcount ratio and the overall per 
capita GDP level to be increasing. That is, (dGR ,  dGP )’ =  [A]
-1 (dH, dG)’, where the inverse matrix, 
[A]-1, is now signed  ++−−.  From this expression, the only way that H and G can both increase (i.e., 
dH > 0 and dG > 0) is if the rich region becomes richer and the poor region poorer (i.e., dGR > 0 and 
dGP < 0).  As discussed in the main text, such a pattern seems to have characterized regional growth 
in the Philippines during 2000-2006.
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